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Constitutionally Different: 
A Child’s Right to Substantive Due Process 
Tiffani N. Darden* 
Kent v. United States required trial courts to conduct an individualized 
assessment before transferring a juvenile defendant to criminal jurisdiction. 
Several decades later, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court prohibited 
imposing life without parole sentences upon youth offenders without first 
conducting an individualized assessment. The latter holding also 
pronounced that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults, finding 
support in social science, developmental psychology and neuroscience 
advancements. This same body of adolescent behavioral research casts 
fundamental fairness concerns on a transferred youth’s ability to effectively 
participate in other parts of the justice process when removed to criminal 
court.  
Whereas due process and the Eighth Amendment have fully draped 
constitutional juvenile issues to date, my Article proposes that substantive 
due process more aptly secures a youth offender’s liberty interests when 
battling disadvantages attributable to their youthfulness traits as 
experienced throughout the entire justice process—from adequate 
representation, to transfer, to trial participation, to the sentencing phase. At 
present, fourteen states absolutely deprive juveniles of an individualized 
assessment at any juncture in the justice process, including at the initial 
jurisdictional transfer determination. This Article contributes the first 
holistic analysis for recognizing the constitutional difference between 
juveniles and their adult counterparts at critical adjudicatory points, not 
only at transfer or the sentencing stage, through a substantive due process 
framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “juveniles are constitutionally different from adults” means 
something more than prohibiting the death penalty and life-without-
parole sentences for youth offenders.1 Many juvenile sentencing cases 
rest on this commonsense observation affirmed through social science, 
developmental psychology, and neuroscience.2 But when juveniles find 
 
1. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)). 
2. Many amicus briefs have been filed in the Supreme Court citing such studies. See, e.g., Brief 
for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13–
24, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief for the APA in Miller] (arguing 
developmental neuroscience research supports that both the structure of the adolescent brain, and 
the way it functions, are immature compared to the adult brain); Brief for the American Medical 
Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 4–30, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief 
for the AMA in Miller] (arguing that juveniles have less “voluntary control of behavior” than adults 
and that there is a biological basis for their behavioral immaturities); Brief for the American 
Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6–27, Graham, 560 U.S. 
48 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief for the APA in Graham] (arguing that developmental 
psychology and neuroscience research supports that juveniles are more immature, vulnerable, and 
changeable than adults); Brief for the American Medical Association and the American Academy 
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4–30, Graham, 
560 U.S. 48 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) (arguing, as they did in Miller, that juveniles have less 
voluntary control over their behavior than adults and that there is a biological basis for their 
behavioral immaturities); Brief for the American Psychological Association, and the Missouri 
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themselves in criminal court, constitutional fundamental fairness 
demands that the entire justice process—not merely sentencing—must be 
adjusted to accommodate their maturity deficiencies.3  
Upon transfer to criminal jurisdiction, a juvenile typically receives 
treatment equal to their adult counterparts, except under limited 
circumstances at the sentencing stage. The juvenile court to criminal 
court transfer mechanism dates back to the inception of juvenile courts.4 
But juvenile offenders’ lack of developmental maturity makes them 
uniquely vulnerable throughout the justice process for the same reasons 
undergirding juvenile sentencing reform.5 The state maintains full 
authority to transfer a juvenile to criminal jurisdiction, but substantive 
due process commands that affirmative rights be given to these juvenile 
defendants to ensure fairness when the risk involves loss of liberty.6 
Identifying these critical stages and providing an individualized 
assessment for transferred youth offenders aligns with political history 
 
Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4–13, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 
(No. 03-633) (arguing that adolescents think and behave differently from adults, emphasizing that 
they engage in more risk-taking, do not properly consider consequences, and their brains are not 
fully developed); Brief of the Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 8–11, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (emphasizing research illustrating 
juveniles’ mental deficiencies); Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondent at 4–20, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (arguing that adolescents at 
age sixteen and seventeen think and behave differently from adults, emphasizing that they engage 
in more risk-taking, do not properly consider consequences, and their brains are not fully 
developed). 
3. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (“We have tried . . . to strike a balance—to 
respect the ‘informality’ and ‘flexibility’ that characterize juvenile proceedings, and yet to ensure 
that such proceedings comport with ‘fundamental fairness’ demanded by the Due Process Clause.” 
(citation omitted)); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 540 (1975) (reiterating the goal that “to the extent 
fundamental fairness permits, adjudicatory hearings [should] be informal and nonadversary”); 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (emphasizing the factfinding procedures 
required to satisfy fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that using the same evidentiary standard in juvenile justice 
cases as in civil cases “amount[s] to a lack of fundamental fairness”); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–
31 (1967) (“[W]e do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment.”). 
4. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE 
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL 
COURT 13, 13–14 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds. 2000) (“[T]he history of transfer 
reveals a diversity of practices, which emerged in the years between the establishment of the 
nation’s first juvenile court in 1899 and the Supreme Court’s pronouncements about the 
constitutionality of transfer in Kent v. United States.”).  
5. See infra notes 156–158 (explaining the Court’s designation of “youthful traits”); see 
generally supra note 2 (stating that juveniles are “constitutionally different than adults” based on 
developmental psychology and research). 
6. See infra Part II. 
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and Supreme Court constitutional trends. 
Kent v. United States and Montgomery v. Louisiana form long fought 
bookends to the treatment of juvenile offenders.7 In 1966, the Kent Court 
reaffirmed the original motivations behind establishing juvenile courts by 
articulating procedural requirements for the discretionary transfer of 
youth offenders to criminal jurisdiction.8 Fast-forward to Miller v. 
Alabama, decided in 2012, which prohibited sentencing juvenile 
offenders under mandatory life-without-parole statutes.9 Under Miller, 
now retroactively applied through Montgomery, the Supreme Court 
demonstrated its reliance on expert opinions in adolescent development 
to assist in setting constitutional boundaries for the treatment of juvenile 
offenders.10 The Kent and Miller Courts suggested individualized factors 
for trial courts to consider when making decisions about transfer and 
sentencing.11 In light of Miller, Montgomery, decided in 2016, noted that, 
because “children are constitutionally different from adults,” they “must 
be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable 
corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside 
prison walls must be restored.”12 
State supreme courts often bifurcate transfer and sentencing issues: 
transfer from juvenile to criminal court receives a procedural due process 
analysis, while sentencing invokes Eighth Amendment issues. In this 
Article, I posit that the Supreme Court’s more recent juveniles “are 
different from adults” designation creates a substantive due process right 
that is not limited to Eighth Amendment sentencing issues but rather 
spans the entire justice process.13 The same adolescent developmental 
 
7. See generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. 
Ct. 718 (2016). 
8. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (“[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such 
tremendous consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of 
counsel, without a statement of reasons.”).  
9. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions 
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances 
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”). 
10. Id. at 488 (“[B]y [the transfer hearing] the expert’s testimony could not change the sentence; 
whatever she said in mitigation, the mandatory life-without-parole prison term would kick in.”). 
11. See id. at 480 (“[W]e require [the sentencer] to take into account how children are different, 
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”); 
Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–68 (listing eight factors for a judge to consider when deciding whether the 
juvenile will be transferred to criminal court. These include, for example, “[t]he seriousness of the 
alleged offense to the community . . .” and “[t]he sophistication and maturity of the juvenile . . . .”). 
12. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736–37.  
13. Id. at 736 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 
(2010); Miller, 567 U.S. 460). 
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research that the courts relied on to reform sentencing norms has also 
been used to identify other stages in the adjudication process wherein 
youth offenders may work at a disadvantage to their adult counterparts, 
calling into question constitutional fundamental fairness concerns.14 For 
example, the adult competency standard applied may not encompass a 
juvenile immaturity evaluation. This distinction calls into question 
juvenile defendants’ ability to understand their basic rights and 
effectively participate in their criminal trials. Youthfulness may also 
lessen a child’s ability to adequately assist counsel. Merging the lessons 
from Kent and Miller inevitably leads to the conclusion that a juvenile’s 
immaturity deficits should be assessed at every critical juncture in the 
justice process, starting with transfer and extending to all mandatory 
sentencing statutes. 
The Supreme Court’s categorization of children as constitutionally 
different from adults recognizes a salient concept that should affect any 
contact a minor may have with the criminal courts.15 This is a substantive 
due process right requiring affirmative action from states that transfer 
jurisdiction for those accused while under eighteen years old to adult 
courts. All fifty states exercise the right to remove children from juvenile 
jurisdiction,16 but fourteen states currently administer wholly 
unconstitutional systems. In these states, there is no juncture at which a 
juvenile receives an individualized assessment before or during 
sentencing. This is an unconstitutional “absolute deprivation” 
considering their age status.17 
The individualized assessment oversight should begin when the state 
seeks to transfer a juvenile to criminal jurisdiction. Only six states place 
the transfer from juvenile to criminal court solely in the discretion of 
juvenile court judges, who, by constitutional requirement, must make an 
individualized assessment: Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Tennessee, 
and Texas.18 Juveniles may also find themselves in a criminal court 
 
14. See supra note 2; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–34 (1967); see generally Emily Buss, The 
Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39 (2003) (discussing Gault’s implications). 
15. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Miller, 
567 U.S. 460). 
16. PATRICK GRIFFIN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 2 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
ojjdp/232434.pdf. 
17. NAT’L CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: AN UPDATED 
ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR REFORM 7 (2008), http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/MFC/MFC_Transfer_2008.pdf. 
18. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22(a) (2018) (“The court may waive jurisdiction and order a 
minor . . . held for criminal proceedings after full investigation and hearing where the person . . . is 
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through mandatory judicial waiver, prosecutorial direct file, or statutory 
exclusion. Six states require mandatory judicial waiver without the safety 
valve of reverse waiver or criminal blended sentencing.19 Two states 
permit prosecutorial discretion with no provisions for reverse waiver or 
criminal blended sentencing.20 And finally, seven state legislatures have 
enacted statutory exclusions to juvenile jurisdiction without an option for 
reverse waiver or criminal blended sentencing when the juvenile 
defendant comes before the court.21 State supreme courts have wholly 
 
alleged to have committed an act that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult . . . .”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2018) (“[T]he county or district attorney[] . . . may file a motion 
requesting that the court authorize prosecution of the juvenile as an adult under the applicable 
criminal statute. The juvenile shall be presumed to be a juvenile, and the presumption must be 
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.”); ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(A) (2018) (“When a 
petition alleges that a juvenile committed an act which would be murder or a Class A, B or C crime 
if committed by adult, the court shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney, continue the case 
for further investigation and for a bind-over hearing to determine whether the jurisdiction of the 
Juvenile Court over the juvenile should be waived.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (2018) (“If a 
petition alleges that a child between the ages of twelve and seventeen has committed an offense 
which would be considered a felony if committed by an adult, the court may, upon . . . motion . . . 
order a hearing and may, in its discretion, dismiss the petition and such child may be 
transferred . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(a)(2) (2018) (requiring “[a] hearing on whether 
the transfer should be made”); TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(c) (2017) (“The juvenile court shall 
conduct a hearing without a jury to consider transfer of the child for criminal proceedings.”). 
19. See IND. CODE § 31-30-3-6 (2018) (“Upon motion by the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile 
court shall waive jurisdiction if” the child is charged with a felony, or the child has previously been 
charged with a nontraffic misdemeanor or felony.); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A) (2017) 
(explaining that mandatory waiver is required for those age fifteen and older charged with first or 
second degree murder, first degree rape, or aggravated kidnapping); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-
2200 (2017) (“If the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony and the court finds probable cause, 
the court shall transfer the case to the superior court for trial as in the case of adults.”); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 27-20-34(1)(b) (2015) (requiring judicial transfer of children over fourteen years old if it 
“determines that there is probable cause to believe the child committed . . . the offense of murder 
or attempted murder; gross sexual imposition or the attempted gross sexual imposition of a victim 
by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping . . . .”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:4A-26.1(c) (West 2018) (“[T]he court shall waive jurisdiction of a juvenile delinquency 
case without the juvenile’s consent and shall refer the case to the appropriate court and prosecuting 
authority if” the juvenile is fifteen or older and is charged with one of the specified crimes); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.10, 2152.12 (West 2018) (stating circumstances in which a child sixteen 
or older is eligible for mandatory transfer in certain circumstances); 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-3 
(2018). 
20. See D.C. CODE § 16-2307(a) (2018); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(1)(b) (2018). 
21. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-204(a)(1)–(7) (2018) (listing crimes for which those over the age 
of sixteen are automatically charged as adults); IND. CODE § 31-30-1-4(a)(1)–(10) (2018) (listing 
crimes for which those between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are charged automatically as 
adults); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A)(1)–(2) (2018) (excluding those aged fifteen and older 
from juvenile jurisdiction after certain procedures are followed and the person is charged with first 
or second degree murder, “aggravated or first degree rape, or aggravated kidnapping”); MINN. 
STAT. § 260B.007(6)(b) (2018) (excepting from the definition of “delinquent child,” a child who 
is charged with first degree murder over the age of sixteen); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2018) 
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supported these methods based on various constitutional arguments.22 
Once transferred under these automatic transfer provisions, Miller 
comes into play to require an individualized assessment at the sentencing 
stage.23 The Miller Court’s holding should not only work to determine 
the appropriateness of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. An 
individualized assessment should also be required to apply any 
mandatory minimum sentence provisions applied to juveniles. 
Accordingly, the constitutionality determination should be adjusted to 
focus on the defendant’s age and whether the state provided an effective 
individualized assessment at either the transfer or sentencing stage. 
Furthermore, I argue, a substantive due process right holds states 
responsible for effective participation throughout the justice process 
when youthful immaturity presents as the “Achilles heel” to fundamental 
fairness principles. 
In this Article, I will move along considering the full meaning of the 
phrase “juveniles are constitutionally different” and its implications 
across the whole justice process.24 That juveniles are constitutionally 
different from adults cannot hold meaning in only the three already 
recognized instances: death penalty, mandatory life without parole, and 
non-homicide offenses.25 Based on the same evidence supporting these 
Supreme Court holdings, we know that transfer to adult court creates 
problematic constitutional questions long before the courts attempt to 
sentence the worst among youthful offenders.26 Therefore, we must flesh 
out what this slow, twenty-year constitutional epiphany means to the 
middle, not just along the edges. 
 
(excepting from the terms “Child” or “Juvenile” those who are charged with a Class A, B, C, or D 
felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-701(1) (West 2018) (“The district court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older charged with an offense that would be murder 
or aggravated murder if committed by an adult.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A)–(C) 
(2018) (excepting from juvenile jurisdiction sixteen or seventeen year olds charged with serious 
violent offenses, certain other violent offenses, or rape of a child in the first degree). 
22. See, e.g., State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1998); People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526 
(Ill. 2014); State v. Hall, 350 So. 2d 141 (La. 1977); Commonwealth v. Wayne W., 606 N.E.2d 
1323 (Mass. 1993); State v. Angilau, 245 P.3d 745 (Utah 2011).  
23. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions 
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances 
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”). 
24. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller, 567 U.S. 460). 
25. See generally Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (relating to mandatory sentencing schemes imposing life 
without parole statutes upon juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting life without parole 
sentences for non-homicide offenses); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (barring death penalty for juveniles). 
26. See supra note 2. 
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Part I reviews the Supreme Court’s sentencing cases that define 
juveniles as constitutionally different from their adult counterparts.27 
These pronouncements find their justification in social science, 
developmental psychology, and advancements in neuroscience, which 
together inform more than culpability.28 This research also gives insight 
into a juvenile defendant’s ability to effectively participate in the justice 
process once transferred to adult jurisdiction.29 In Part II, I propose that 
substantive due process provides a constitutional doctrine to protect 
youth, based on their age status, when removed from juvenile jurisdiction 
to criminal court.30 This argument extends the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning from the sentencing stage to other critical stages wherein a 
juvenile defendant’s youthfulness traits make them uniquely 
vulnerable.31 Part III illustrates how juveniles are shuttled through the 
adult justice system with no individualized assessment at any critical 
juncture in the process.32 The discussion addresses those states that 
absolutely deprive juvenile defendants of any status recognition once 
transferred to criminal court.33 Finally, Part IV analyzes the transfer 
process in depth.34 This deliberation details jurisdictional transfer 
mechanisms that consider an individualized assessment and alternative 
transfer methods that forgo such considerations.35 In conclusion, the 
system of statutorily converting juvenile delinquents into criminal 
 
27. See infra Part I.  
28. See, e.g., Brief for the APA in Miller, supra note 2, at 25–26 (citing Laurence Steinberg, 
Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742 (2009)) (stating “By now, ‘[t]here is incontrovertible evidence of 
significant changes in brain structure and function during adolescence,’” and noting that brain 
structures that are essential to “planning, motivation, judgment, and decision-making . . .” are 
developed during adolescence); Brief for the AMA in Miller, supra note 2, at 7–10 (“Scientists 
have identified various interrelated immaturities in adolescents’ self-regulatory abilities that 
contribute to their limitation in controlling their impulses and their greater tendency to engage in 
risky or reckless behavior.”); Brief for the APA in Graham, supra note 2, at 16 (citing Margo 
Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision 
Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
625, 626–34 (2005), and explaining that a study “found that exposure to peers during a risk-taking 
task doubled the amount of risky behavior among mid-adolescents (with a mean age of 14), 
increased it by 50 percent among college undergraduates (with a mean age of 19), and had no 
impact at all among young adults.”). 
29. See supra note 28. 
30. See infra Part II. 
31. See infra Part II. 
32. See infra Part III. 
33. Infra Part III. 
34. Infra Part IV. 
35. Infra Part IV. 
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defendants requires that their youthfulness traits be weighed long before 
reaching the fateful sentencing stage, based on a substantive due process 
right that permeates the justice process. 
I.  VALIDATING THAT CHILDREN ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY DIFFERENT 
FROM ADULTS  
The juvenile sentencing trilogy sets forth categorical bans for juvenile 
offenders, those under the age of eighteen years old at the time of their 
alleged criminal act: Roper v. Simmons prohibited the death penalty, 
Graham v. Florida prohibited life without parole for those committing 
non-homicide offenses, and Miller v. Alabama prohibited applying 
mandatory life-without-parole sentencing statutes.36 Importantly, in 
Roper, the Supreme Court relied on social science, developmental 
psychology and neuroscience to augment the commonsense reasoning it 
used to support previous age-based holdings.37 
Roper v. Simmons marked a continuation in the Supreme Court’s 
attempt to articulate the role of age when imposing the death penalty.38 
The constitutional difference between adults and juveniles rests on 
evidence-based conclusions that youth possess a diminished culpability, 
such that conventional penological justifications prove impertinent in this 
context.39 First, a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more 
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in 
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”40 Second, 
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and 
outside pressures, including peer pressure. . . .This is explained in part by 
 
36. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 
(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 576 U.S. 460 (2012). 
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–75. 
38. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (finding it unconstitutional to impose capital punishment 
for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 
367 (1993) (“A sentence in a capital case must be allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of 
youth in the course of its deliberations over the appropriate sentence.”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361, 405 (1989) (finding that “the execution of juvenile offenders violates contemporary 
standards of decency”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (reiterating that “the 
Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed 
by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is 
too obvious to require extended explanation.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) 
(holding youth to be a necessary mitigating factor in death penalty cases, characterizing youth as 
“more than a chronological fact,” but as a “time and condition of life when a person may be most 
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage”). 
39. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–75. 
40. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367). 
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the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less 
experience with control, over their own environment.”41 And third, “the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The 
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”42 
According to the Roper Court, juveniles’ lack of maturity explains that 
“their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an 
adult.”43 Additionally, juveniles’ “vulnerability and comparative lack of 
control over their immediate surroundings” lessens the expectation and 
responsibility to remove themselves from a harmful situation.44 And 
finally, a juvenile’s amorphous self-constitution tamps down the validity 
of any definitive determinations that “even a heinous crime committed 
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”45 The 
Graham majority echoed Roper’s acceptance of the constitutional 
difference between juveniles and adults, stating that “developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences 
between juvenile and adult minds.”46 
After Graham, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court addressed 
whether a Miranda custody determination must consider the juvenile 
suspect’s age.47 The Court reached back to its older juvenile-related 
holdings leaning on common sense to decide that children should not be 
held to the same standard as adults.48 In this context, the Supreme Court 
opined that  
officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of 
developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise 
in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They 
simply need the common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-
year-old and neither is an adult.49 
Only one year later, the Supreme Court returned to external experts to 
 
41. Id. (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115). 
42. Id. at 570. 
43. Id. (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835). 
44. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).  
45. Id. 
46. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
47. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011); see Roper, 543 U.S. 551. See generally 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that law 
enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during 
interrogations while in police custody). 
48. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 262 (“In the specific context of police interrogation, events that ‘would 
leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm’ a teen.” (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 
332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948))). 
49. Id. at 279–80. 
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uphold constitutional sentencing boundaries for juveniles.50 Of 
significance, Miller introduced the procedural requirement of an 
individualized assessment to accompany the prohibition against applying 
mandatory life-without-parole statutes to juvenile defendants in criminal 
court.51 Thereafter, Montgomery v. Louisiana labeled the new rule to be 
a substantive change of law duly implemented through procedure.52 
Under a dimmer spotlight, the Montgomery Court rejected the state’s 
argument that the individualized assessment conducted at the transfer 
stage substitutes for an individualized assessment at the sentencing 
stage.53 
In Miller, the two cases under review involved fourteen-year-old 
defendants prosecuted in adult criminal courts based on transfer statutes 
controlled by prosecutorial discretion.54 The Court addressed the 
constitutionality of mandatory life without the possibility of parole 
statutes as applied to juvenile offenders.55 The Court relied on two sets 
of sentencing cases to determine the sentencing scheme was 
unconstitutional: categorical bans based on disproportionality between 
the defendant’s characteristics and the offense committed and prohibition 
against imposing the death penalty without an individualized 
consideration of the defendant’s characteristics.56 With these precedents 
in mind, the Court reiterated Roper’s core reasoning and Graham, which 
“establish[ed] that children are constitutionally different from adults for 
sentencing purposes.”57 The Miller Court laid bare the intersection 
between youth and sentencing as follows: 
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of 
his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home 
environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually 
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects 
the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may 
 
50. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
51. Id.  
52. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
53. Id. at 734–35. 
54. Miller, 567 U.S. at 466, 468–69 (describing the Arkansas and Alabama statutes permitting 
transfer of the juvenile defendants to adult criminal court, both under prosecutorial discretion). 
55. Id. at 465. 
56. Id. at 470. 
57. Id. at 461 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 68 (2010)). 
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have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged 
and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated 
with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or 
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist 
his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards 
the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most 
suggest it.58 
Although the Court did not remove life without parole as a sentencing 
option for juveniles, Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, predicted 
that in light of the sentencing trilogy’s statements on “children’s 
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, . . . 
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible 
penalty will be uncommon.”59 
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court granted retroactive application for 
its ban against sentencing juveniles under mandatory life-without-parole 
statutes.60 The Court’s explanation for why Miller constituted a new 
substantive rule, not merely a procedural change, helps clarify the 
interplay between an offender’s age and the sentencing determination.61 
The Court stated that: 
A hearing where “youth and its attendant characteristics” are considered 
as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may 
be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not. The hearing 
does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding 
that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose 
crimes reflect transient immaturity.62 
At first blush, it seems that the sentence length dictates the need for an 
individualized assessment. The Court made it clear that the Eighth 
Amendment violation is sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, 
except in the rarest of circumstances; only through an individualized 
assessment may courts avoid imposing such a disproportionate 
punishment.63 Montgomery reminded us that Miller not only required 
trial courts to consider the offender’s age, but also went further to 
 
58. Id. at 477–78 (citations omitted) (citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011); 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 78).  
59. Id. at 479. 
60. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016). 
61. “Protection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the 
Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a defendant’s sentence.” Id. at 
732–33. 
62. Id. at 735 (citations omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465). 
63. “Miller did bar life without parole . . . for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose 
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. . . . Before Miller, every juvenile convicted of a homicide 
offense could be sentenced to life without parole.” Id. at 734. 
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“establish[] that the penological justifications for life without parole 
collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’”64 
Constitutional procedures erected at the outcome stage do not clear the 
state’s conscience. With the parens patriae duty now fermented into 
constitutional law, policymakers must address the juvenile defendant’s 
ability to fairly fight at the stages leading up to a sentencing hearing.65 
The Supreme Court reflected on a collection of youthfulness traits to 
conclude that juvenile offenders possess a lesser culpability as compared 
to adults, which led to tangible results in the sentencing context.66 The 
question remains as to what other tangible results may be gained through 
the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that juveniles are constitutionally 
different from adults according to evidence-based traits of youthfulness. 
Individualized assessment tailored to the adjudicatory stage may be 
required to protect the substantive rights these differences create. 
II.  MOLDING A JUSTICE PROCESS FOR JUVENILES OFFENDERS  
The Court’s initial interventions with administering justice for 
juveniles came down as fundamental fairness holdings, grounded in due 
process, and meant to restrain juvenile courts.67 In the criminal context, 
the Court has embraced the juvenile court’s recognition that children are 
different from adults by articulating custodial rights under the Fourth 
Amendment and sentencing rights under the Eighth Amendment.68 The 
juvenile sentencing cases Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery 
significantly changed how the constitutional standards applied to youth 
offenders.69 These cases prohibited states from executing juveniles, 
imposing sentence of life without parole for those juveniles convicted of 
non-homicide offenses, and applying mandatory life-without-parole 
 
64. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).  
65. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 69–
70 (2008) (“[T]he state’s parens patriae authority is invoked when the government acts on the basis 
of society’s moral obligation to care for its weak and dependent members; here, the focus is on the 
interest and welfare of individual children affected by the regulation.”). 
66. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (Explaining that children’s “lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” vulnerability “to negative influences and outside 
pressures,” and character that is “not as well formed as an adult’s” makes children less culpable 
than adults (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 460, 471)). 
67. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1975); 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller, 
567 U.S. at 479; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
69. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Miller, 567 U.S. 460; 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718. 
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statutes to juveniles.70 The Court’s prospective impact on juvenile 
sentencing appears clear cut, but the reverberation of its rulings 
throughout the justice process is much less straightforward. 
A.  The Genesis of Individualization and its Intersection with 
Substantive Due Process 
In constitutional terms, the Supreme Court’s treatment of juveniles 
establishes a categorical approach that requires contextual application via 
individualized assessment. In Graham v. Florida, the Court categorically 
banned life without parole for non-homicide offenses with the contextual 
caveat that juveniles should be given a reasonable opportunity for 
parole.71 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court implored law 
enforcement to consider an offender’s age when deciding whether 
individuals realize that they are being held in police custody.72 In 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court clarified that juveniles should be 
sentenced to life without parole only on rare occasions and that an 
individualized assessment must be performed before imposing such a 
harsh penalty.73 
Legislation affecting a juvenile’s treatment in the justice process must 
consider their unique traits of youthfulness to pass constitutional muster. 
The Supreme Court provides limited direction for states implementing its 
declaration that “children are constitutionally different;” thus, lawmakers 
traverse murky territory.74 The statutory confluence that absolutely 
deprives an accused juvenile offender in criminal court of an 
individualized assessment highlights structural problems that require a 
unitary constitutional resolution. A moderate extension of the juvenile 
sentencing cases reveals the need to develop special sentencing 
guidelines for juveniles transferred to criminal courts. More ambitious 
 
70. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (barring capital sentences for juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 
(prohibiting life without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses); Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 
(holding that juvenile mandatory life sentences without parole are unconstitutional); Montgomery, 
136 S. Ct. at 732 (holding Miller applies retroactively).  
71. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
72. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011). 
73. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. 
74. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper, 542 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). In Making 
the Crime Fit the Punishment, Professor Joseph Kennedy articulates a quasi-constitutional clear 
statement rule for interpreting federal criminal statutes grounded in substantive due process. This 
need partially arises because “it is hard to infer from the Court’s past decisions on the federal 
sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, or the death penalty any desire to substitute 
the Court’s own moral judgments about the proportionality of punishment for the judgment of the 
relevant legislative body.” Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 753, 760–761 (2002). 
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arguments arise, as set forth below, regarding an adolescent’s ability to 
fully and effectively participate in trial proceedings.75 What should we 
consider the overarching constitutional guidance, beyond a simple 
“children are different” when determining how a state should treat its 
juvenile offenders? 
Substantive due process accommodates the requirement that states 
remain cognizant that children are different from adults when transferred 
to criminal court, recognizing this as a permeating right to ensure a 
juvenile’s constitutional treatment throughout the justice process. Some 
constitutionally regulated areas, such as term-of-years sentences, 
effective assistance of counsel, conditions of incarceration, and the 
presumption of competency to stand trial have yet to be analyzed in light 
of the criminal defendant’s youthfulness traits. This oversight seems 
detrimental considering the well-documented disadvantages and 
consequences that someone’s immaturity may play during the 
adjudication phase.76 Such recognition does not require states to grant 
juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile offenders, but it does 
require that we identify points that are ripe for affecting fundamental 
fairness based on youthfulness traits. 
From the perspective of juvenile offenders, their status demands the 
state to acknowledge the deficiencies associated with their youthfulness. 
The liberty interest for transferred youth, protected pursuant to 
substantive due process, would run more broadly than an Eighth 
Amendment protection attached on the backend, at the sentencing 
phase.77 These rights may be reasonably accommodated through an 
individualized assessment, combined with any assistance required to 
ensure fundamental fairness in adjudication proceedings, mitigated 
punishments where appropriate, and rehabilitative services needed to 
facilitate a meaningful opportunity for release. 
Substantive due process rights stem from values deeply rooted in 
American legal history and traditions but also allow for expressing 
national values through constitutional law.78 A transferred juvenile’s 
constitutional protections properly show our nation’s both traditional and 
historical support for individualized assessment. While individualized 
 
75. See infra notes 140–144 and accompanying text. 
76. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in 
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. L. 741 (2000). 
77. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 
171–73 (2015). 
78. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972)). 
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assessment for juveniles is abundant in our nation’s history and 
traditions,79 the Supreme Court exercises restraint when establishing a 
fundamental right under substantive due process.80 But, in using expert 
research to usher in the approach of distinguishing children from adults, 
individualization, and the importance of rehabilitation in criminal court 
for juvenile offenders, the Court expands criminal courts’ obligations to 
act in the children’s best interest when they are transferred to criminal 
court.81 
The pathway to no individualized assessment creates a constitutionally 
untenable justice process. The obvious solutions come into play by 
enacting the provisions available in other jurisdictions: reverse waiver, 
expanded criminal blended sentencing, judicial approval of prosecutorial 
direct file, and so on.82 At present, the Supreme Court’s juvenile 
sentencing trilogy legitimizes the child development research that 
supports more sweeping reforms such as increasing the jurisdictional age 
limit for courts.83 A more consistent change would be to recognize 
juveniles, a discrete class of individuals, as a known quantity deserving 
of affirmative protections that permeate the justice process. But the state 
bears additional burdens above and beyond its obligations to adult 
defendants when transferring juveniles from this safe harbor to criminal 
jurisdiction. Similar to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
youthfulness requires tangible procedural protections at critical stages in 
the justice process.84 Moreover, comparable to special qualifications 
required of death penalty counsel, attorneys for juveniles should possess 
 
79. As compared to the historical explanation, a second explanation has been described where 
substantive due process can be used by the “Supreme Court to protect new rights and to invalidate 
governmental policies even if those policies have longstanding and continuing support in American 
law and society . . . [and for] identification of personal liberties that it deems appropriate for our 
contemporary society.” Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 63, 107, 112 (2006). 
80. [B]ased on reason and therefore on reasons, albeit reasons grounded ultimately on 
considerations of philosophical, moral, and political theory . . . informed by an elaborate 
process of adjudication, including arguments and counterarguments from the parties and 
from amici curiae, . . . in the end, the Court must defend its judgment in a written opinion. 
Id. at 110. 
81. When not supported by the Constitution, original intent, or “the immanent values of 
American history and tradition[, i]t will instead have to defend itself by articulating with clarity and 
integrity the constitutional values that inform its judgment.” Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 106 (2003). 
82. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16 (explaining various transfer mechanisms). 
83. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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adequate credentials when representing juveniles in criminal court.85 
The right to counsel, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, attaches 
throughout the justice process. In Massiah v. United States, the Supreme 
Court made clear that a defendant’s right to assistance from counsel 
attaches before trial.86 In reviewing an interrogation not formally 
conducted in custody, the Court affirmed Powell v. Alabama’s statement 
that “from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, 
when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are] 
vitally important, the defendants . . . [are] as much entitled to such aid [of 
counsel] during that period as at the trial itself.”87 In Escobedo v. State of 
Illinois, the Court clarified that pre-indictment interrogations sit 
alongside preliminary hearings and arraignments, with each stage capable 
of “affect[ing] the whole trial.”88 From a global perspective, the Court 
reasoned that: 
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to 
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication 
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth 
preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult 
with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If 
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a 
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with 
that system.89 
Similar to the right to counsel, for juveniles transferred to criminal 
court, a permeating right should attach when the juvenile is initially 
transferred to criminal court, persist as the case percolates through the 
justice process, and continue through sentencing. This right requires the 
implementation of procedural measures—an individualized 
assessment—to ensure fundamental fairness despite juveniles’ 
youthfulness and immaturity. In addition to competency, we may even 
imagine a second look at standards for requiring attorney qualification for 
juveniles’ legal representation. And the list may grow as social science, 
 
85. See Counsel for Financially Unable Defendants, 18 U.S.C. § 3599(b) (2018) (requiring 
attorneys who are provided to defendants that are financially unable to obtain adequate 
representation to “have been admitted to practice in the court in which the prosecution is to be tried 
for not less than five years, and must have had not less than three years of experience in the actual 
trial of felony prosecutions in that court.”). 
86. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
87. Id. at 205 (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
60 (1932)). 
88. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485–86 (1964) (quoting Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 
45, 54 (1961)). 
89. Id. at 490. 
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developmental psychology, and neuroscience connect with the criminal 
courts to identify disparities and disadvantages unique to juvenile 
offenders. 
The juvenile offender transferred to criminal court challenges our 
constitutional and societal commitments to fundamental fairness.90 
Whether prosecuting a juvenile or adult, common goals emerge to 
underscore fundamental fairness: the defendant should understand the 
legal proceedings, be able to assist counsel, and make decisions 
independently based on sound, rational mental faculties.91 From a 
constitutional perspective, juveniles’ maturity may greatly compromise 
their ability to meet the competency threshold to stand trial.92 From a 
societal perspective, most juvenile offenders (especially those transferred 
to criminal jurisdiction) re-enter their communities with the viewpoint 
that Lady Justice failed them in the fairness department. This contributes 
to recidivism because it feeds hopelessness and engraves chips on 
juvenile offenders’ shoulders. 
Criminal laws, both in isolation and in the aggregate, would violate a 
substantive due process right to individualized review when they are 
enacted without deliberating the difference between children and adults 
in light of research from social science, developmental psychology, and 
neuroscience.93 For example, blanket prescriptions like statutory 
exclusion and mandatory sentences should be considered 
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, because they are not 
accompanied by an individualized assessment or alternatively, evidence-
 
90. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 150–52 (noting that this challenge to fairness arises 
from a lack of emphasis on competence in criminal proceedings); Introduction to Part II: 
Adolescents’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 67, 68–70 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Thomas 
Grisso, What we Know about Youths’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A 
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE supra, at 139, 159. 
91. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 150; Introduction to Part II: Adolescents’ 
Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 67, 68–70; Thomas Grisso, What We Know about Youths’ 
Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 139, 159. 
92. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (explaining that the test for 
competency to stand a criminal trial is “whether [the defendant] has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him”). Currently, only three states provide competency 
hearings that include developmental immaturity for juvenile offenders: South Dakota, New 
Hampshire and Maine. Six states have no juvenile standard for competency evaluations: Hawaii, 
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Indiana and Rhode Island. Juvenile Court, Competency 2015, 
JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-court# 
competency-to-stand-trial?category=1 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
93. See supra notes 2, 28. 
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based legitimate government justifications.94 Note that this suggestion in 
no way forecloses reaching equal outcomes for an adult and juvenile 
offender, but a deliberative study process must precede any such statute’s 
passage. This substantive right would most often manifest through 
procedural requirements. 
As previously set forth, substantive due process rights are deeply 
rooted in American legal history and tradition, but they also allow for the 
expression of national values through constitutional law.95 History and 
tradition confirm that children require special attention when accused of 
criminal activity, and both the process of adjudication and punishment 
should vary from adult criminal trials due to sweeping considerations that 
are unique to the offender’s age.96 Considering the historical separation 
between juvenile and adult offenders, which has been illustrated in legal 
precedent combined with empirical research on adolescents, provides a 
necessary check on judicial overreach.97 Regarding history and tradition, 
Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, infamously wrote that: 
through the course of this Court’s decisions [due process] has 
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of 
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty 
and the demands of organized society . . . . The balance of which I speak 
is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history 
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the 
traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.98 
The terms and conditions applied to juvenile delinquents build on age-
old principles. The socio-political history, dating back to Progressive era 
reforms and legal precedent, shows the deep roots individualized review 
for juveniles has in American history; however, this issue as a procedural 
 
94. Post, supra note 81, at 97–98 (arguing that whereas substantive due process finds support 
in tradition, the Lawrence v. Texas opinion demonstrates that “the Court is concerned with 
constitutional values that have not heretofore found their natural home in the Due Process Clause”). 
95. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
96. In describing the historical tradition approach based on Glucksberg, Conkle explains “it is 
our national history that delimits and circumscribes the rights that qualify for special protection. 
And this national history is itself revealed by ‘deeply rooted’ societal patterns and legal policies.” 
Conkle, supra note 79, at 91. 
97. “[T]he approach of historical tradition provides an objective standard of decisionmaking, 
and it is a standard that judges are competent to employ on a consistent and principled basis.” Id. 
at 92. Judicial overreach has been a traditional argument against enumerating new fundamental 
rights, stemming from the failures of the Lochner v. New York era, when a right to free contracting 
was deemed fundamental as a substantive due process right. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This view of 
freedom to contract as a fundamental right resulted in lack of governmental regulation regarding 
labor conditions and pay.  
98. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961). 
230 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  50 
 
problem suffers from such an analytical approach.99 The common law 
drew age distinctions in an attempt to assign culpability for criminal 
behavior.100 Juvenile courts were established pursuant to the common 
law doctrine of parens patriae.101 The foundational goal of rehabilitating 
delinquents remains a founding pillar of juvenile jurisdiction.102 
The Supreme Court accommodated youthfulness traits in sentencing 
juveniles by accepting advancements in social science, developmental 
psychology, and neuroscience.103 On its face, this breaks the historical, 
traditional mold. It moves the Court further from majoritarian support to 
upholding a counter-majoritarian narrative deemed constitutional by an 
independent, yet unelected federal branch of government.104 
Substantive due process as a doctrinal justification draws skepticism 
from some legal observers and provides legal cover for the Court’s 
intervention into truly controversial national conversations.105 Skeptics 
of enumerating new substantive due process rights might argue that, if 
the Supreme Court enumerated a fundamental right to individualized 
review, it would at minimum substitute its judgment for that of elected 
state legislators in shaping criminal law, as it applies to juvenile 
offenders; on the other hand, the proposal herein may be viewed as a 
nudge for state legislators to rethink their policymaking process when 
criminalizing juvenile behavior.106 Substantive due process rights are 
 
99. Glucksberg requires a narrowly defined issue supported through history and tradition. 
Conkle argues that, in determining whether a substantive due process right exists, the Court “is 
discerning the precise nature of the political-moral issue at hand so that it can determine whether 
an asserted claim of liberty has the affirmative support of a historical tradition, thereby providing 
the claim with a majoritarian sanction.” Conkle, supra note 79, at 93. 
100. See Tiffani Darden, Exploring the Spectrum: How the Law May Advance a Social 
Movement, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 261, 273–74 (2016) (explaining how Graham, Roper, and Miller 
considered juveniles’ lack of culpability due to immaturity to require individualized review in 
certain circumstances). 
101. Tanenhaus, supra note 4, at 17–18 (illustrating that the recognition of the childhood and 
social conceptions of law informed the juvenile courts’ basis in the medieval English doctrine of 
parens patriae).  
102. See Darden, supra note 100, at 273 (explaining the holdings in Graham, Roper, and Miller 
“that juveniles carry less culpability” and therefore “deserve lesser punishment and more 
rehabilitation”). 
103. See supra notes 2, 3, 28; Conkle, supra note 79, at 94, 139–40 (illustrating the ingredients 
of a forward looking rationale, as compared to a backward looking rationale).  
104. Conkle, supra note 79, at 107, 112 (explaining that an unelected Court using the “theory 
of reasoned judgment permits substantive due process to perform a nationalizing function through 
the recognition and protection of fundamental rights as a matter of constitutional law”). 
105. Id. at 64. 
106. Conkle opined that “it is hardly surprising that some have condemned the entire enterprise 
of substantive due process, calling it an unjustified judicial usurpation of political power and a 
flagrant violation of the basic principle of majoritarian self-government.” Id. at 78–79.  
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based on the Court’s reasoned judgment, which entails balancing 
personal liberty interests against countervailing government interests.107 
The state’s interests in supporting jurisdictional waiver to criminal court 
for juvenile offenders can be gleaned from adoption of the Kent factors 
by most state courts. Noticeably, the proffered reasons for supporting 
jurisdictional waiver omit any attempt to reconcile these interests, 
centered around public safety, with the state’s “best interest” commitment 
to minor children. 
The Supreme Court rarely grants affirmative rights through its 
constitutional interpretations, and the Court’s constitutional explications 
rarely arrive as a package deal adhering throughout an entire process; 
instead, substantive due process holdings lean toward prohibiting 
government interventions associated with a well-defined interest.108 
Here, the liberty interest revolves around recognizing that juvenile 
offenders lack the capacity to endure an adult criminal justice system, and 
the resulting need to construct evidence-based policies identifying where 
their youthful traits make juveniles acutely vulnerable to suffering 
disadvantages based on their age. To fully appreciate this constitutional 
protection, we must not isolate any particular stage in the justice process 
from transfer to adjudication to sentencing. Instead, the notion that 
“children are different” requires states to view a process that at any 
juncture may disadvantage juvenile offenders in different ways based on 
individualized traits, culminating in the aggregate at the Eighth 
Amendment sentencing stage.109 
The constitutional acceptance that children are different from adults 
seems to have penetrated only so far through our treatment of juvenile 
offenders. Whereas the juvenile court stridently implements philosophies 
and practices that stand in stark contrast to criminal jurisdiction, not much 
promise for an overhaul appears on the horizon for children who find 
themselves dropped into an adult’s world. Juvenile and criminal courts 
have shared a nebulous partition for over one hundred years. Since the 
inception of juvenile courts, state legislatures have debated upper age 
limits and the transfer option.110 Judicial waiver stood as the predominant 
 
107. Id. at 66–67 (explaining this approach and noting that the Court used it in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and in Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
108. See Yoshino, supra note 77, at 167–68 (illustrating the Court’s shift from the use of 
negative/positive rights to a concept of equality). 
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
110. Tanenhaus, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that age limits “kept older children out of the 
juvenile justice system” and the transfer option allowed judges to remove those accused of heinous 
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transfer mechanism for several decades, during which time judges 
undertook individualized assessments of youth offenders to determine 
their amenability to treatment or their need for more severe punishment 
in criminal court.111 Individualized assessment should not end once the 
decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court has been made. A 
substantive due process right to individualized review throughout the 
entire process in criminal court will ensure juveniles are afforded the 
same opportunity to withstand the criminal justice process as adults. 
B.  Fictitious Status Equivalence  
The legal fiction of children being equal to their adult counterparts may 
be written in statutes, but it does not convert the state’s substantive 
commitments to juveniles.112 The Supreme Court has made clear that 
even though criminal courts may handle cases involving juvenile 
offenders, states must accommodate youthful attributes when 
appropriate.113 The choice to transfer children from juvenile jurisdiction 
should not exonerate states from their parens patriae duties for minors in 
government custody. Lessened culpability requires more than merely a 
reduced sentence to fulfill a state’s obligations to its youthful individuals. 
The Supreme Court chipped away at the worst-case scenarios using broad 
language, but its opinions leave little guidance for decisions regarding 
transfer and sentencing of children in criminal court.114 
 
crimes from the juvenile system); Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE 
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL 
COURT, supra note 4, at 207, 207 (characterizing the transfer option as a “universal exception to a 
universal rule”). 
111. Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 45, 
45 (illustrating that judicial waiver weighed the juvenile’s capability of rehabilitation against 
“whether the interest of the community would be served by the prosecution of that offense in 
criminal court rather than juvenile court”).  
112. For example, Louisiana state actors may transfer juvenile offenders to adult criminal court 
using various procedures: discretionary waiver, mandatory waiver, prosecutorial discretion and 
statutory exclusion. Once in criminal jurisdiction, the justice system provides no pathway back to 
juvenile jurisdiction via reverse waiver or juvenile or criminal blended sentencing provisions. 
Juvenile Court, Transfer Provisions, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., 
http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries/louisiana#transfer-provisions?age=-1&offense=-1 
&policy=3&year=2016 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
113. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016); Miller v. Alabama 567 U.S. 
460, 479 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
576–77 (2005). 
114. Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the 
Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 147 (2013) (“The Court has reached the outer limits of what it 
can accomplish through interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. . . . The specific amount by which 
sentences imposed on youths should be substantially discounted is a political and legislative value 
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Together, Roper, Graham, and Miller shined a light on juvenile 
sentencing practices.115 But the constitutional difference between 
juvenile and adult offenders implicates fundamental fairness rights long 
before reaching the sentencing phase. In Miller, the Supreme Court began 
drawing distinctions between the purpose of individualized assessments 
at varying phases in the adjudication process.116 The Miller majority 
distinguished between an individualized assessment for a juvenile 
offender at a discretionary judicial waiver determination and at the 
sentencing stage.117 The Court gave two reasons for making this 
distinction: first, “the decisionmaker typically will have only partial 
information at this early, pretrial stage about either the child or the 
circumstances of his offense;” and second, “the question at transfer 
hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at a post-trial 
sentencing. . . . It is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor 
deserves a (much) harsher sentence . . . while still not thinking life-
without-parole appropriate.”118 For those reasons, a judge’s available 
discretion at the transfer stage cannot substitute for discretion at post-trial 
sentencing in adult court—and so cannot satisfy the Eighth Amendment. 
Miller dismissed the argument that a jurisdictional waiver evaluation 
equates to the individualized assessment required to ensure the 
constitutional protections attached with imposing a sentence of life 
without parole.119 Therefore, the imagination need not travel far to argue 
in good faith that discretionary transfer statutes also may not stand in lieu 
of pinpointing the critical stages where one’s youthful individual traits 
must be acknowledged to guarantee fundamental fairness in the justice 
process. 
With this in mind, the same social science, developmental psychology, 
and neuroscience research supports the need for individualized 
assessments in other specific parts of the criminal justice process where 
constitutional rights are potentially infringed due to a juvenile’s 
immaturity.120 Trial rights for youth offenders as trial defendants provide 
 
choice.”); Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and 
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 110 (2013) (questioning the 
diminished capacity rationale’s application to juvenile reform beyond death penalty and mandatory 
life without parole). 
115. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 556; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Montgomery, 
136 S. Ct. at 734. 
116. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480–89. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 488. 
119. Id. at 482–83. 
120. See supra notes 2, 28. 
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the most urgent example where policy recommendations based on 
developmental research would have a constitutional foothold under 
current substantive due process arguments as an area in which “juveniles 
are constitutionally different from adults.”121 Adjusting competency 
standards for transferred juveniles marks a solid next target in both 
expanding a juvenile’s distinct constitutional rights as compared to their 
adult counterparts and defining a permeating right, under substantive due 
process, for youth offenders in criminal courts.122 
Few jurisdictions weigh a juvenile’s diminished capacity, as compared 
to adult offenders, when considering their ability to meet constitutional 
competency standards.123 In juvenile court, competency holds less 
significance because, at least in theory, the civil proceedings of that court 
seek to rehabilitate rather than punish the accused.124 But juvenile 
developmental characteristics should affect the competency evaluation, 
and this evaluation then necessarily demands a resolution that is different 
from that of an adult deemed incompetent to stand trial. 
This opinion enjoys credibility among scholars. In Youth on Trial and 
Rethinking Juvenile Justice, scholars asserted that ensuring a defendant’s 
competence serves more than an individualistic interest. It also secures 
societal interests in three ways: “preserving the dignity of the criminal 
process, reducing the risk of erroneous convictions, and protecting the 
defendant’s decision-making autonomy.”125 The denoted baseline, 
wrapped into the term “competency,” must be present throughout the 
 
121. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005)); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 150 (explaining that using these 
differences when implementing the principles of proportionality and due process is a way to further 
ensure fundamental fairness). Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and 
Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 73, 85–86, 90 (“In our view, considerations of both fairness and judicial 
economy suggest that the juvenile’s competence to proceed in the criminal court should be a 
prerequisite for waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court.”). 
122. “In short, the same concerns that support the prohibition against trying criminal defendants 
who are incompetent due to mental impairment apply with equal force when immature youths are 
subject to criminal proceedings.” SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 157. 
123. Three states provide competency hearings that include developmental immaturity for 
juvenile offenders: South Dakota, New Hampshire and Maine. Six states have no juvenile standard 
for competency evaluations: Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Indiana and Rhode 
Island. Juvenile Court, Competency 2015, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., 
http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-court#sex-offense-registry?year=2015 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
124. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 82–83 (noting that because juvenile proceedings do 
not have the punitive purposes of criminal proceedings, the importance of competency is 
diminished based on juvenile proceedings’ “rehabilitative objectives”).  
125. Id. at 76; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 153 (noting that these three basic 
functions serve as basic rationales for the competence requirement). 
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justice process—from pretrial hearings, to plea offerings, to trial and 
sentencing. Reviewing the subject from an adult defendant’s viewpoint 
and layering in the complications for juvenile defendants based on social 
science research clearly exposes how policy suggestions from the past 
two decades should now gain greater fortitude as constitutional 
obligations under the juvenile sentencing holdings.126 
Dusky v. United States set forth the path for measuring a criminal 
defendant’s competency to stand trial.127 A criminal defendant must have 
both a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding,” and a “rational as well as 
factual understanding of proceedings against him.”128 Shortly thereafter, 
Drope v. Missouri solidified competency as a fundamental fairness 
right.129 Based on Supreme Court precedent, an adult defendant, when 
deemed incompetent to stand trial, will spend up to six months receiving 
rehabilitative psychiatric care.130 
Youth competency requires a different approach. An individualized 
assessment provides valuable insight because maturity varies greatly 
from one juvenile offender to another.131 The sophisticated offender with 
superior knowledge based on repeat contact with the system has proven 
to be a myth; instead, intelligence, race, socioeconomic status, and mental 
health, rather than experience, influence children’s understanding of the 
legal process.132 For some youth, their attorney may be able to informally 
fill in the gaps of their knowledge. But an immature youth, or one 
suffering from emotional disturbances or learning disabilities, will not be 
cured in six months with a pill or institutionalization.133 Unfortunately, 
social scientists and juvenile advocates have concluded that merely 
requesting an evaluation provides a constitutional salve with little 
 
126. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–77; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
127. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
128. Id. at 402. 
129. 420 U.S. 162 (1975). 
130. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 78–79.  
131. “There is a great deal of individual variation in maturation rates; . . . [A]dolescence and 
adulthood are not tidy developmental categories; the transition to adulthood is a gradual process.” 
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 237. See Grisso, supra note 90, at 163 (showing that youths 
under fourteen years old are less likely to be competent, but age tends to be a bad indicator of 
competence for youths ages fourteen to sixteen). 
132. Grisso, supra note 90, at 151–52, 163 (pointing to studies that show intellectual 
functioning, ethnicity and socioeconomic status, mental disorder are correlative to understanding 
of legal information rather than age and experience). 
133. Id. at 164. 
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attention given to “getting it right” on mental competency.134 At this 
time, some states address competency to stand trial at the waiver stage, 
either via statute or pursuant to judicial mandate.135 
Upon counsel’s advice, defendants must individually decide whether 
to plead guilty, whether to seek a jury or bench trial, whether to testify or 
exercise the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, whether a particular 
defense seems advantageous, and whether the overall strategy feels 
palpable. A lack of competency to stand trial in adult criminal court poses 
the greatest threat to adolescents fifteen years old and younger.136 First, 
the standard criteria of mental illness presents differently in youth than 
they do in adults.137 Second, a youth offender may be at a disadvantage 
due to developmental immaturity, a trait not contemplated when 
evaluating adults for competency.138 Younger defendants may 
understand the proceedings to a satisfactory degree on the surface, but 
their decision-making acumen could be impaired based on developmental 
immaturity.139 
In Youth on Trial, Professor Thomas Grisso separates minors’ abilities 
into two concepts: (1) adolescents’ competence to stand trial and (2) their 
effectiveness of participation.140 An example showing an adolescent’s 
lack of competence to stand trial manifests in juveniles’ incomplete 
understanding of rights.141 Also, youth offenders do not fully appreciate 
 
134. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 151 (illustrating that competency requirements 
were a response to judicial decisions requiring it for due process and not for the purpose of ensuring 
juveniles were actually competent to stand trial); Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 78 (noting 
that, in practice, “adjudicative competence is that asking the question is more important than getting 
the ‘right’ answer” because “the criminal justice system [has] a variety of motivations for raising” 
the competence issue other than the basic rationales underlying the doctrine itself); see VA. CODE 
§ 16.1-269.1(A)(3) (2018) (requiring a juvenile to be considered “competent to stand trial” as a 
condition to discretionary judicial transfer. In Virginia, juveniles are “presumed to be competent 
and the burden is on the party alleging the juvenile is not competent to rebut the presumption by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . .”). 
135. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 151. 
136. “Judicial review of the defendant’s competence for criminal adjudication should be 
mandatory in cases involving fourteen- to fifteen-year-old defendants.” Bonnie & Grisso, supra 
note 121, at 90. 
137. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 159–60; Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 87–
88; Grisso, supra note 90, at 160 (noting that youths have certain psychosocial characteristics that 
are “in transition,” including responsibility, temperance, and perspective).  
138. Note 137, supra. 
139. Note 137, supra. 
140. “[E]ffectiveness of participation focuses us on a continuum of lesser to greater capacities 
for contributing to one’s defense, and it provides a foundation for seeking ways to maximize 
defendants’ effectiveness.” Grisso, supra note 90, at 141. 
141. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 159 (illustrated through a conversation with one 
of the author’s twelve-year-old son, who when asked what the right to remain silent meant, 
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long-term consequences.142 Moreover, their status as adolescents in a 
process inundated with adults could inhibit effective participation.143 
 I propose that effective assistance of counsel should also be enveloped 
into the substantive due process rights that deserve protection based on a 
juvenile’s constitutional differences from their adult counterparts. Even 
before transfer, based possibly on prosecutorial discretion, juveniles may 
have shucked the right to remain silent and attain counsel, thus providing 
information that the prosecutor can use to make a decision on waiver.144 
However, many youths do not fully appreciate their rights and the role 
that counsel can play in protecting those rights.145 This deficit based on 
maturity associated with age cannot go ignored by state courts. 
The juvenile sentencing cases formulate a constitutional class, but the 
procedural cases predating this era too often simply conscript adult rights 
to be applied in the juvenile context. In re Gault recognized concerns 
affiliated with young defendants, which heightened the attorney’s role: 
The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile 
Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege [against 
self-incrimination]. If counsel was not present for some permissible 
reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken 
to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it 
was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of 
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.146 
The Court often speaks in cautionary terms, but the Court has never 
installed state obligations unique to a juvenile offender in criminal courts 
before the sentencing stage. 
As the Court’s doctrine creates a paint-by-numbers portrait of juvenile 
justice, legal commentators and advocates continue to understand the full 
heft to be gained from the Court’s supplementation of common sense by 
considering science and social science to attain some significance in 
shaping constitutional law. The Graham and Miller Courts hypothesized 
 
responded “It means you don’t have to say anything until the police ask you a question.”); Grisso, 
supra note 90, at 149 (stating that one-half to two thirds of adolescents did not understand that a 
court could not penalize them for avoiding self-incrimination, compared to thirty percent of adults). 
142. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 91. 
143. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 160 (arguing that an adolescent may not understand 
the role of an attorney and may feel as though all of the adults are allied against them, particularly 
if they see their attorney speaking with the prosecutor outside of the courtroom); Bonnie & Grisso, 
supra note 121, at 89. 
144. THOMAS J. BERNARD & MEGAN C. KURLYCHEK, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 167 
(2d ed. 2010). 
145. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
146. Id. at 55. 
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that harsh sentences may share a connection to an adolescent’s inability 
to effectively communicate with law enforcement and meaningfully 
engage in criminal court proceedings.147 Scholarship fully diagnoses the 
import of lessened culpability both before and after the Court’s reliance 
on social science, developmental psychology and neuroscience research; 
the rehabilitation ideal also receives much attention, but the role of trial 
competence deserves analysis in this context.148 
The fundamental fairness rights historically granted to children in 
juvenile court protected their individual procedural rights.149 The 
Supreme Court’s sentencing cases bring individualization to this same 
group even when they have been deemed adults under criminal law.150 
Youthfulness traits transcend the jurisdictional distinction established in 
state houses. The sentencing trilogy resurrected and formalized what was 
already known from Kent v. United States and the cases injecting 
fundamental fairness into the juvenile court.151 The reach to realizing that 
children are constitutionally different seems able to grow with our 
knowledge about adolescent development if challenges are properly 
scrutinized under substantive due process in a manner established by the 
Court’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment precedents.152 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCE TRANSCENDS JURISDICTION 
In nearly a dozen states, transfer and sentencing procedures suppress 
any formal weight that may be given to youthful characteristics.153 There 
exists a too-often-traveled but rarely exposed unconstitutional road to 
 
147. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 
(2012). See ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., MODELS FOR CHANGE: SYS. REFORM IN JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING 4 (2015), 
http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/778 (noting that “‘developmental’ incompetence 
has become very salient in the past generation”). 
148. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 147, at 4. 
149. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1. 
150. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735–36 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at 480; 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
151. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553–54 (1966). 
152. Pointing to Lawrence v. Texas and Grutter v. Bollinger as illustrations, Professor Robert 
Post observes that the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional law at times permits space for 
adjustment when constitutional culture and values are not settled on a contentious social debate. 
Post, supra note 81, at 104–05. Conkle, supra note 79, at 67–68 (“[S]ubstantive due process 
protects a set of evolving national values, values that command widespread contemporary support, 
as evidenced by legal developments and societal understandings that may change over time.”). 
153. These include Alabama, DC, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, 
South Carolina, Utah, and Washington. See generally Juvenile Court, Intake and Diversion 2016, 
JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-court#sex-offense-
registry?year=2015.  
2018] Constitutionally Different 239 
 
treatment as an adult in the justice process. The only detour that may 
occur arises for those being threatened with life-without-parole sentences 
upon conviction.154 Some states convict more juveniles than others under 
life-without-parole statutes: Michigan convicted disproportionately large 
numbers of juvenile offenders pursuant to those statutes, along with 
California, Florida, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania.155 Beginning in Roper 
v. Simmons and culminating with Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme 
Court depended on generalized youthful traits to mitigate the most severe 
of those sentences.156 These characteristics include immaturity, 
susceptibility to environmental pressures, and malleable personalities.157 
The Court’s acceptance of this developmental psychology supported a 
conclusion that an adolescent’s amorphous self-determination 
undermines the notion that “even a heinous crime committed by a 
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”158 
A.  Beyond Juvenile Jurisdiction for Severe Misdeeds 
In Vienna Township, Michigan, in October 2017, five teens were held 
without bond on second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit 
second-degree murder charges.159 The teens, ranging from age fifteen to 
seventeen, had thrown numerous rocks off a bridge onto the expressway 
below.160 One of those rocks struck and damaged a van, which swerved 
off the road.161 The front-seat passenger in that van, a young father 
returning home from a blue-collar hard day’s work, died from their ill-
fated actions.162 The Genesee County prosecutor swiftly decided to try 
all five defendants in adult criminal court.163 This case raises policy 
 
154. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
155. AMNESTY INT’L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE U.S., 35 tbl.5 (2005), https://www.hrw.org/report/ 
2005/10/11/rest-their-lives/life-without-parole-child-offenders-united-states. 
156. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
553 (2005). 
157. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
158. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553. 
159. Karma Allen, 4 of 5 Teens in Deadly Michigan Rock-Throwing Case Attempt Plea Deals, 
ABC NEWS (July 17, 2018, 4:35 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/teens-deadly-michigan-rock-
throwing-case-accept-plea/story?id=56634773. 
160. Id. 
161. Mike Martindale, 4 of 5 Teens Accept Plea Deals in I-75 Rock-Throwing Death, DETROIT 
NEWS (July 16, 2018, 2:48 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/2018/07/16/4-teens-
accept-plea-deal-75-rock-throwing-death/789011002/. 
162. Id. 
163. 5 Teens Charged as Adults in Rock-Throwing Death on I-75 in Vienna Township, 
WWMT.COM (Oct. 23, 2017), https://wwmt.com/news/state/5-teens-charged-as-adults-in-rock-
throwing-incident-on-i-75-in-vienna-township. 
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questions stemming from traditional legal practices, developmental 
psychology, constitutional shifts in favor of children’s rights in the 
criminal system, and social attitudes. Public comments demanding 
retribution and shunning contrary perspectives spewed forth in response 
to this tragedy.164 Many expressed sentiments similar to the following: 
“What thoughtless idiots! They deserve long prison sentences. So 
unbelievably senseless.” Yes, bad acts warrant due consequences; these 
teens should, if found guilty under the law, be held accountable for their 
misdeeds. But the law no longer tolerates an unmoored mob mentality or 
turning a blind eye on the perpetrators’ age-related developmental 
shortcomings. The justice process cannot overlook the constitutionally 
recognized differences between children and adults when prosecuting or 
punishing criminality.165 
Raising the jurisdictional limit in Michigan would have affected the 
fate of those teens from Vienna, but a singular focus on jurisdictional age 
limits leaves intact transfer procedures. The national “raise-the-age” 
campaign has proven successful just this year in nudging New York and 
North Carolina to raise the age at which offenders are automatically sent 
to criminal court, a legislative change to be gradually phased in over two 
to three-year periods.166 Michigan sits alongside a handful of states 
reticent about increasing the maximum jurisdictional age for juvenile 
courts above sixteen years old.167 But not even successful raise-the-age 
advocacy could save the five youths charged in Genesee County, 
Michigan from a justice process that appears unwilling to consider their 
 
164. Associated Press, 5 Michigan Teens Charged with Murder After Rock Thrown from 
Highway Overpass Kills Man, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 23, 2017, 10:56 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-michigan-teens-rock-incident-
20171023-story.html. 
165. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016); (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005)). 
166. See generally RAISE THE AGE NY, http://raisetheageny.com/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018). 
167. States that limit juvenile jurisdiction to age sixteen or below are Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Texas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Missouri. See WIS. STAT. § 938.02(10m) (2018) (defining 
“juvenile” when “investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated any state or 
federal criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance,” as not including “a person who has 
attained 17 years of age”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(a) (2018) (granting exclusive original 
jurisdiction to the family division of circuit court for those under 17 years old if they are charged 
with certain offenses); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2)(A) (West 2015) (defining “[c]hild” as 
someone “ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(10)(B) 
(2018) (defining “[c]hild” as someone “[u]nder the age of 17 years when alleged to have committed 
a delinquent act”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2008) (defining “[c]hild” as “a person less than 
seventeen years of age”); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031(1)(3) (2018) (“[T]he juvenile court . . . shall 
have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings . . . [i]nvolving . . . any person who is alleged to 
have violated a state law . . . prior to attaining the age of seventeen years.”). 
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age as a mitigating factor.  
The Genesee County prosecutor’s press conference addressed the 
circumstances surrounding the victim’s death, the charges, and potential 
punishments while ignoring the age of those accused.168 And in 
Michigan, their age will not be considered to mitigate their 
blameworthiness for these actions or the sentence if convicted on these 
charges. In the worst-case scenario, they are convicted of second-degree 
murder and the judge entertains a sentence of life without parole.169 
Remember, of course, that this is an outcome that the Supreme Court 
thinks should be imposed rarely.170 In fact, the Supreme Court purchased 
Lady Justice discerning spectacles to use whenever minors enter any 
jurisdiction threatening the loss of their liberty, be it juvenile or criminal. 
There was one moment in which the Genesee Sheriff spoke 
incontrovertible truth: “At the end of the day nobody wins. The young 
people are charged criminally, a young boy lost his father and all of the 
families are left grieving.”171 From there, these state-elected law 
enforcement officials digressed into statements wholly detached from 
constitutional norms.172 The prosecutor and sheriff boasted about their 
dereliction of the indisputable constitutional norm that children are 
different from adults.173 Sheriff Pickell approached the podium by stating 
“I want to commend Prosecutor Leyton for the strong stand that he has 
taken today in charging second-degree murder along with conspiracy and 
other charges.”174 The joint press conference continued along with one 
revelatory statement after another showing both men’s obliviousness 
about what most know to be adolescent behavior. 
The sheriff justified the charges in terms of general deterrence: “I think 
if there’s any admonition, any warning that both David and I can give—
 
168. Brian Thompson, Five Teens Charged with Murder in Rock Throwing Incident Near Flint, 
MI HEADLINES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.miheadlines.com/2017/10/23/five-teens-charged-
with-murder-in-rock-throwing-incident-near-flint/ [hereinafter Genesee County Press Conference] 
(providing a video of the press conference). 
169. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (describing that in some states, judges 
do have the discretion to apply life-without-parole to juveniles). 
170. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision 
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”). 
171. Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168; Amanda Jackson, Rock Dropped from 
Overpass Kills Passenger in Car; Teens Charged, CNN (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:27 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/23/us/flint-teens-rock-throwing-murder-trnd/index.html (reporting 
incident and including video coverage). 
172. See generally Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168. 
173. Id. 
174. Id.  
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it’s telling young people: you make a bad decision, you could be spending 
the rest of your life in prison. This is not a prank.”175 The psychological 
evidence, of course, does not support general deterrence as an effective 
punishment goal for juveniles.176 Yet both men impressed upon their 
audience that the prosecutor “threw the book” at these teens and he could 
not could not “charge anything more.”177 And “second-degree murder is 
punishable by up to life in prison.”178 Meanwhile, Graham and Miller 
dedicated their prose to undercutting the legitimacy of life without parole 
for juveniles.179 
The prosecutor referenced these teenagers using adult standards of 
behavior, stating what “a reasonable person would know,” and claiming 
that “these people should have known better. These people should have 
realized that their actions would cause great bodily harm or death and 
under Michigan law that’s second-degree murder.”180 The act, in and of 
itself, is a childish activity. And the conspiracy attaches because law 
enforcement believed that “prior to the actual events they discussed 
getting rocks and going out there and hurling them.”181 The irony reveals 
itself when noting that these actions are exactly those that juveniles 
commonly exhibit. Juveniles more often act in groups and exhibit an 
increased susceptibility to peer pressure.182 
The prosecutor and sheriff sought to allay the public’s fears that 
anyone may be “soft on crime” by reminding the community that law 
enforcement threw the book at these young defendants, that a more 
serious charge could not be brought under state law, and that second-
degree murder is eligible for a sentence of life in prison. Yet children are 
not miniature adults.183 This realization guides the hallmarks of our 
juvenile justice system and the impetus for our Supreme Court’s mandate 
 
175. Id. 
176. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“[T]he absence of evidence of deterrent 
effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than 
adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”). 
177. Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168. 
178. Id. 
179. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317 (2018) (“[M]urder of the second degree . . . shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of years, in the discretion of the 
court trying the same.”). See generally Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168. 
180. See generally Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168. 
181. Id. 
182. Dustin Albert et al., Peer Influences on Adolescent Decision Making, 22 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 114, 115 (2013), available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/ 
10.1177/0963721412471347 (“[P]eer influences [are] a primary contextual factor contributing to 
adolescents’ heightened tendency to make risky decisions.”). 
183. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011). 
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that these youthful characteristics should be considered before imposing 
a punishment of life without parole on young offenders.184 Raise-the-age 
efforts address the most significant contributor to children being retained 
in juvenile courts: the upper and lower age limits established by state 
jurisdiction.185 Yet transfer laws lay bare deficiencies in the justice 
process, which, with no pause, neglect to make an individualized 
assessment of youthful traits indispensable when considering culpability 
and punishment.186 
Youthful characteristics lessen one’s culpability for criminal 
behavior—meaning age transcends both crime and jurisdictional 
boundaries.187 Michigan’s justice process ignores this constitutional 
mandate. Michigan keeps company with approximately a dozen states 
that forge a pathway lacking any accommodation for youthfulness once 
a minor is transferred to criminal court.188 And this road sits obscured 
from the public’s eye. How does this happen? 
In these states, a youth offender is transferred to criminal court through 
prosecutorial direct file or statutory exclusion, neither of which requires 
an individualized assessment.189 Then, Michigan state law does not 
afford this jurisdictional assignment any right to reconsideration through 
a reverse waiver hearing which would usually entail an individualized 
assessment by the criminal judge.190 If convicted, state law may require 
 
184. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012). 
185. See, e.g., id. at 466, 468 (referencing Arkansas and Alabama age limits); RAISE THE AGE 
NY, supra note 166. 
186. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16 (analyzing state transfer laws). 
187. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833–35 (1988) (“[T]he Court has already endorsed 
the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a 
comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require 
extended explanation.”). 
188. See Juvenile Court, Intake and Diversion 2016, supra note 153.  
189. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (“Statutory exclusion laws grant criminal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain classes of cases involving juvenile-age offenders. If a case falls 
within a statutory exclusion category, it must be filed originally in criminal court.”); Benjamin 
Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative Effects of State Direct File Waiver Laws on Violent 
Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1451, 1451 (2006) 
(“Concurrent jurisdiction, or direct file, statutes afford prosecutors the unreviewable discretion to 
charge certain juveniles in either juvenile or criminal court.”).  
190. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (“Reverse waiver laws allow juveniles whose 
cases are in criminal court to petition to have them transferred to juvenile court.”); see also Written 
Comments of Amicus Curiae Human Rights Watch, Henry Hill v. United States, Case No. 12.866, 
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. app. (2014), available at https://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/2014_03_19_hrw_amicus_appendix_ 
state_transfer_laws.pdf [hereinafter State-By-State Summary of Transfer Laws] (noting that 
Michigan does not provide a reverse waiver mechanism). 
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a minimum or mandatory punishment with no option for a blended 
sentence which would permit an individualized assessment.191 Instead, 
with no reverse waiver or blended sentencing statute in Michigan, the 
final opportunity for an individualized assessment would be a petition to 
consider life without parole.192 Most serious charges that fall within this 
window are not eligible for the harshest penalty available to juvenile 
offenders and thus miss this opportunity as well. Because this system 
does not take youthfulness into account, it does not comport with 
constitutional standards. 
Moreover, this case study shows how the justice process grants little 
attention to a teen’s competency to stand trial. Three of the five teens 
accused in Michigan sought competency hearings.193 The state examiners 
deemed all three mentally competent to stand trial in criminal court.194 In 
response, their defense attorneys requested independent evaluations; the 
trial judge granted these defense motions.195 One lawyer stated,  
While my client may be considered competent to aid in his defense in 
the cozy confines of a doctor’s office, under the bright lights of the 
courtroom, juveniles tend to have a different mindset. . . . In these 
circumstances where we have a child facing his loss of liberty, it’s 
extremely prudent to leave no stone unturned and get this independent 
examination.196 
Every state grants judges the discretion to transfer cases from juvenile 
to criminal court.197 Discretionary judicial waiver takes place under 
transparent due process standards.198 In conjunction with employing 
juvenile psychology experts who are knowledgeable of the offender’s 
circumstances, the juvenile judge makes an individual assessment based 
on several factors that evaluate the alleged offense, the defendant’s 
 
191. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 3 (showing which states employed certain waiver 
and sentencing schemes as of 2011). 
192. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized 
sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider 
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”). 
193. See Martindale, supra note 161. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Oona Goodin-Smith, Teens Charged in Deadly I-75 Rock Throwing to Get Second Mental 
Health Exam, MLIVE (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2018/01/ 
second_opinion_needed_before_t.html (quoting Frank J. Manley). 
197. See State-By-State Summary of Transfer Laws, supra note 190. 
198. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555–57 (1966) (explaining that “the critically 
important” judicial waiver decision entitles a juvenile “to a hearing, including access by his counsel 
to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, 
and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.”). 
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background and profile, and institutional concerns.199 Only fifteen states 
grant prosecutors discretion to choose to bring charges against a youth 
defendant in either juvenile or criminal court.200 Of these prosecutorial 
direct file states, only Michigan and Florida do not provide a check on 
these decisions by a criminal judge via reverse waiver procedures.201 In 
Michigan, the minimum age for prosecutorial discretion is set at fourteen 
years old for enumerated offenses; thereafter, these juveniles must be 
sentenced “in the same manner as an adult.”202 And although many states 
have enacted blended sentencing statutes that consider a defendant’s age 
after conviction in criminal court, the Michigan blended sentencing 
statute only provides for individualized assessment under limited 
circumstances involving drug charges.203 
Some states responded to Miller v. Alabama with sweeping reforms 
targeted at the juvenile system.204 Texas overhauled its system to 
abandon life without parole as a sentencing option for convicted 
juveniles, permit transfer only through discretionary waiver provisions, 
and permit juveniles to challenge transfer decisions through an expedited 
appeals process.205 California dispensed with prosecutorial direct file by 
passing Proposition 57, which requires a juvenile court to review transfer 
petitions seeking to prosecute youth offenders in criminal court.206 On 
the other end of the spectrum, Michigan state actors continue to 
demonstrate a persistent reticence against moderating their treatment of 
juvenile offenders to reflect the essence of recent constitutional 
rulings.207 
 
199. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(4)(a)–(f) (2018) (explaining that a judge must 
consider the “seriousness of the alleged offense . . . [t]he culpability of the juvenile [and] . . . [t]he 
adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system,” among other 
factors when determining whether to waive jurisdiction). 
200. See State-By-State Summary of Transfer Laws, supra note 190. 
201. See id. at 10, 23 (providing data for Florida and Michigan). 
202. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2d (2018). 
203. Id. § 712A.2d (1)–(9) (explaining that a court must consider specified individual factors 
when determining whether to grant prosecutorial waiver, but this only applies in regard to 
“specified juvenile violation[s],” which include assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, escape 
from a juvenile facility, and drug offenses, none of which would have applied to the Vienna 
defendants). 
204. See 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012). 
205. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 2017). 
206. Proposition 57: The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 Frequently Asked 
Questions, CAL. DEP’T CORR. & REHAB., (updated May 2018), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ 
proposition57/docs/FAQ-General-Pro-57-Final-Regs-May-2018.pdf. 
207. See Jessica Pishko, The Troubled Resentencing of America’s Juvenile Lifers, THE NATION 
(Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/juvenile-lifers-last-chance/. 
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In fact, the Michigan Supreme Court initially declined to retroactively 
resentence juveniles previously sentenced to life.208 Eventually, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana initiated a 
resentencing process that has produced mixed outcomes across the 
country.209 In the same year, many states—California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio, and Wyoming—ruled that 
resentencing should contemplate a meaningful opportunity for release 
and not result in a de facto life sentence exceeding natural life 
expectancy.210 On the other hand, Michigan prosecutors initially sought 
to reinstate the life-without-parole sentences for a significant portion of 
the state’s petitioners in contradiction of progressive interpretations.211 
But, the state’s legislature eventually enacted law requiring the courts to 
impose “a term of imprisonment for which the maximum term shall be 
60 years and the minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more 
than 40 years.”212 As interpreted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the 
 
208. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 849 (Mich. 2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub 
nom. Carp v. Michigan, 136 S. Ct. 1355 (Mem) (2016), and cert. granted, judgment vacated sub 
nom. Davis v. Michigan, 136 S. Ct. 1356 (Mem) (2016). 
209. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
210. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1060, 1064 (Cal. 2016) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 
3051(e) (2018)) (stating “[i]n short, a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of 
LWOP for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller” and explaining that “[t]he 
Legislature has declared that ‘[t]he youth offender parole hearing to consider release shall provide 
for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release’”); Connecticut v. Delgado, 151 A.3d 345, 355 
(Conn. 2016) (applying Montgomery in a resentencing case but ultimately finding the particular 
case did not need resentencing); Atwell v. Florida, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 2016) (“A 
presumptive parole release date set decades beyond a natural lifespan is at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s recent pronouncement in Montgomery.”); People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 888 (Ill. 2016) 
(“A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical 
effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—
in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison . . . . [A] juvenile may not be sentenced to a 
mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, 
and potential for rehabilitation.”); State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016) (“[W]e adopt 
a categorical rule that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility for 
parole under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.”); State ex rel. Morgan v. Louisiana, 217 
So. 3d 266, 277 (La. 2016) (finding a ninety-nine year sentence to be “the functional equivalent of” 
a life sentence warranting an opportunity for release); State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1137 (Ohio 
2016) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence that denies a juvenile some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”); 
Poitra v. Wyoming, 368 P.3d 284, 290 (Wyo. 2016) (noting that “[t]he law has drawn a bright line 
at the age of eighteen” before which there must be a “meaningful chance at parole,” but that the 
defendant was over the age of eighteen when he committed the crime). 
211. Ryan Grimes, Prosecutors Ignoring Supreme Court Call to Give Juvenile Lifers a New 
Sentence, Says ACLU, MICH. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/ 
prosecutors-ignoring-supreme-court-call-give-juvenile-lifers-new-sentence-says-aclu. 
212. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25(9) (2018). 
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statute directed prosecutors to pursue the maximum term.213 
The jurisdictional transfer from juvenile to criminal court begins the 
wrenching consequences for youth fighting against a powerful “tough on 
crime” tide. The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Angilau, provided an 
example of the standard reasoning applied in cases transferred without an 
individualized judicial determination.214 The state court applied a rational 
basis analysis to the substantive due process arguments, because in its 
view, no fundamental right or interest arises when assigning adjudicatory 
jurisdiction.215 The juvenile court system stands under legislative 
authority, “and the legislature can choose to exclude certain minors from 
that system so long as the exclusion is not arbitrary or impermissibly 
discriminatory.”216 To these legal boundaries, the Utah court reasoned 
that 
[p]rotection of society from dangerous individuals is unquestionably a 
legitimate government purpose, and potentially longer incarceration is 
rationally related to that purpose. The qualifications regarding age and 
severity of crime are not arbitrary, because they reasonably relate to the 
degree of threat to society that an individual might pose. . . . Nor are 
those qualifications discriminatory in ways objectionable under the 
Utah or federal constitutions.217 
The Utah Supreme Court toes a familiar analytical line in dispensing 
with the procedural due process challenge. Narrowing the question to its 
simplest deductive logic, the state supreme court reasoned that the 
juvenile defendant “did not possess any initial statutory rights associated 
with juvenile court protections and thus could not be deprived of rights 
he never held.”218 The defendant’s pathway to criminal court in Utah sits 
in direct contrast to the transfer statute reviewed in Kent v. United States, 
wherein the juvenile court presumptively held jurisdiction in the first 
instance.219 
 
213. See People v. Skinner, 877 N.W.2d 482, (Mich. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d 918 N.W.2d 292 
(Mich. 2018). 
214. 245 P.3d 745 (Utah 2011). 
215. Id. at 749 (quoting State v. Candedo, 232 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2010)) (“This court will uphold 
a statute under the rational basis standard ‘if it has a reasonable relation to a proper legislative 
purpose, and [is] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.’”). 
216. Id. (citing State ex rel. N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
217. Id. at 750. 
218. Id. at 751 (“Because Mr. Angilau held no initial right (statutory or constitutional) to be 
brought before a juvenile court, there was no need for a hearing before charging him in adult court. 
The automatic waiver statute, therefore, does not violate procedural due process.”). 
219. Compare Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (providing presumptive jurisdiction), 
with Angilau, 245 P.3d at 751 (denying juvenile court protections). 
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This rational basis analysis clearly omits the “constitutionally 
different” language considered in the juvenile sentencing trilogy, thus 
showing how putting these pieces together has yet to take hold in the 
transfer context.220 Moreover, the Utah court’s treatment of the 
sentencing issue in the procedural due process realm calls into question 
the fuller understanding of youth relied upon by the United States 
Supreme Court. Consider the following passage: 
Mr. Angilau argues he had a liberty interest at stake because of the 
longer and harsher sentences available in adult criminal court, and 
because of the possibility of being incarcerated in adult institutions. The 
incarceration question is a distinct and separate issue, which we do not 
address here, because it is not the subject of the automatic waiver 
statute.  The statute at issue controls jurisdiction but mentions nothing 
regarding location or conditions of incarceration. As far as the “harsher” 
sentences available in adult court are concerned, they do not implicate 
a liberty interest for Mr. Angilau, because he was never entitled to 
juvenile jurisdiction once he met the criteria in the automatic waiver 
statute. One cannot hold an interest in something to which one was 
never entitled.221 
In this case, and in post-Miller cases, we see how this distinction 
becomes untenable if the mantra that “children are constitutionally 
different from adults” is to carry any weight to invoke continued reform. 
B.  The Progressive Movement Envisioned A Different Path  
The government’s parens patriae authority grounds the juvenile 
justice system in common law.222 It encompasses an obligation to protect 
a child’s welfare.223 For the Progressive reformers who created the 
juvenile justice system, rehabilitation meant a government obligation to 
return juvenile offenders into society as fully functioning contributors.224 
Advancements in psychiatry and psychology fueled the notion that 
professionals could diagnose and cure deviant behavioral patterns in 
children.225 The government also exercised its police power to serve 
societal interests.226 The Progressive’s approach focused on the 
 
220. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). 
221. Angilau, 245 P.3d at 750 (citations omitted) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-A-6-701 (West 
2018); State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1005 (Utah 1995)). 
222. See Tanenhaus, supra note 4, at 18; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 70. 
223. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 69–70. 
224. Id. at 93. 
225. Id. at 87–88.  
226. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality, 
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individual offender, assuming society would receive residual benefits in 
decreased juvenile crime rates and increased numbers of productive 
citizens.227 
The traditional juvenile court sought to reform delinquency on a lesser 
scale than the crimes currently addressed through transfer to criminal 
court and blended sentencing statutes.228 Juvenile incidents involving 
murder, rape, and lethal violence did not present with the frequency seen 
in modern society.229 In its original form, transfer to criminal court, when 
approved through judicial process, served two pragmatic ends: (1) the 
state’s obligation to protect both citizens and other incarcerated juveniles 
from incorrigible defendants and (2) the recognition that not every child 
will be amenable to rehabilitation.230 Early juvenile court proponents 
frowned upon procedure and legal representation because the 
proceedings were not meant to have an adversarial nature.231 Instead, the 
court aimed to understand the act in question and provide a rehabilitative 
prescription to prevent future transgressions.232 
Over time, the court’s indeterminate sentencing power, cloaked under 
individualized treatment motives, deteriorated into unpredictable 
punitive detention terms.233 In re Gault exposed deficiencies of the 
juvenile courts.234 If the courts randomly meted out punishment without 
showing reformation in defendants, then the youth defendants deserved 
procedural rights akin to their adult counterparts in criminal court.235 The 
 
peace and quiet, law and order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional 
application of police power to municipal affairs.”). 
227. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 87 (explaining objectives). 
228. CHAD R. TRULSON ET. AL, LOST CAUSES: BLENDED SENTENCING, SECOND CHANCES 
AND THE TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION 17 (2016). 
229. Id. (“More serious offenders—youthful murderers, rapists, and other violent youths—were 
simply few and far between in those days, and were never the driving force in the development of 
early juvenile institutions such as house of refuge or, for that matter, the juvenile court.”). 
230. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 97 (noting the pragmatic effects of judicial 
transfer). 
231. Id. at 87. 
232. Id. at 87–88. 
233. “The rulings of the courts slowly began to abandon individualized treatment and 
proportionality in juvenile punishment and instead began to resemble adult criminal courts with 
penal sentences justified with parens patriae.” Lahny R. Silva, The Best Interest Is the Child: A 
Historical Philosophy for Modern Issues, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 415, 424 (2014). 
234. See BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 95–96. 
235. Id. at 100–01 (“There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the 
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor 
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children. . . . The Court also made it 
clear it would view the juvenile justice system from a due process perspective. Thus, parens patriae 
was dead . . . .”). 
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In re Gault majority held that “the appearance as well as the actuality of 
fairness . . . may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so 
far as the juvenile is concerned.”236 With that, the parens patriae doctrine 
lost its omniscience for justifying unbridled control over a youth’s fate. 
For each right permitted adult offenders, the Supreme Court weighed it 
against the purpose undergirding a separate juvenile court. For example, 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania addressed the right to a jury trial.237 The Court 
reasoned that the need for clear fact-finding in juvenile courts suffered no 
harm when judges performed the task in lieu of juries.238 
The Supreme Court granted youth a panoply of other procedural rights 
to secure fundamental fairness in juvenile court proceedings.239 These 
due process rights stabilized the ability to treat children differently from 
adults while preserving the legal protections given anyone at risk of 
losing their liberty to incarceration.240 Institutional growing pains led to 
the import of rights borrowed from adults and scaled to children’s 
prerogatives. This period brought necessary order to juvenile 
adjudicatory proceedings. These cases also established juvenile traits that 
transcend jurisdiction when applying constitutional criminal procedure. 
Whereas social science provided an undercurrent to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions, the Court has seemed more so guided by social science, 
developmental psychology and neuroscience in its Eighth Amendment 
pronouncements since Roper v. Simmons.241 
 
236. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967). 
237. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 530 (1971). 
238. Id. at 545–46; BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 112. 
239. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966) (affording juveniles due process 
rights including the right to a hearing and to retain effective counsel); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
at 33–34, 55–56 (providing juveniles the right to notice of charges, confrontation of witnesses, 
cross-examination, privilege against self-incrimination). 
240. BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 103–04 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
held that juveniles do not have to give up any legal protections in exchange for special care and 
concerns). 
241. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (“A lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults . . . . [Therefore, 
a] sentencer in a capital case must be allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in the 
course of its deliberations over the appropriate sentence.”); but see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 
361, 378 (1989) (“The battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eight Amendment; and in 
that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not an available 
weapon.”), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“[T]he Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability 
should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. 
The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation.”); see also Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (holding youth to be a necessary mitigating factor in death 
penalty cases, characterizing youth as “more than a chronological fact,” but as a “time and condition 
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During the 1990s, public sentiment dictated that a juvenile committing 
an adult act must serve an adult sentence because the offense’s severity 
signified the juvenile’s maturity.242 Constitutional law now concedes 
that, despite their transfer to criminal court, we still need to recognize that 
youth offenders are not adults.243 This means more than just revamping 
sentencing procedures at the most severe edges. States must review the 
full justice process when transferring juveniles to the adult justice system. 
These children are not “miniature adult” criminals; the Progressive era 
reformers acknowledged this distinction and constitutional juvenile 
sentencing cases affirm the distinction with evidence from social science, 
developmental psychology, and neuroscience evidence.244 The Supreme 
Court resurrected the legal differences due juvenile offenders after a long 
stint in which politics controlled the narrative to reorganize the laws that 
govern juvenile courts and transfer mechanisms of transfer to criminal 
court.245 The Supreme Court tussled with advocates through the 1960s 
and 1970s in calming the pendulum swing between constitutional rights 
for juveniles in the justice system; the most recent sentencing opinions 
open another frontier for rights discovery independent of understanding 
this state created juvenile court system.246 
IV.  THE GATEKEEPERS TO CRIMINAL COURTS 
Juvenile crimes fall on an expansive spectrum, ranging from petty theft 
to heinous murders. The system deals with both extremes through 
concrete policies. Minor offenses often fulfill the requirements for 
diversionary programs in juvenile court. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the Supreme Court provides guidance on how to sentence 
juveniles who commit the most unconscionable crime of murder, which 
cannot result in the death penalty or a mandatory sentence of life without 
parole.247 A large swath of criminal behavior may be found between these 
extremes. Transfer statutes display the struggle to adequately handle 
these cases. The Supreme Court, in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. 
 
of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage”). 
242. BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 164. 
243. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 
(2012); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
244. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274–75 (2011).  
245. See BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 182–84. 
246. Id. at 182–83. 
247. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (barring capital sentences for juveniles); Miller, 567 
U.S. at 478 (finding mandatory life without parole sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders 
unconstitutional). 
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Alabama, addressed each theory of criminal punishment as it applied to 
juvenile offenders.248 Whereas rehabilitation is a central goal for the 
juvenile courts, transfer statutes inherently bring all four theories of 
punishment to bear upon a juvenile offender. 
A.  The Gray Area: From Juvenile to Criminal Jurisdiction for 
Unpredictable Youth 
Transfer statutes unlock the criminal courts to young offenders.249 
These statutes reveal inconsistencies in constitutional protections 
afforded juvenile offenders, expose state resistance to Supreme Court 
pronouncements, and mark the starting point for advocacy efforts.250 
Many youth will eventually outgrow their criminal behaviors, no matter 
how extreme their one-time tendency to violence or irreverence to 
property rights.251 The rare juvenile delinquent who exhibits career 
criminal antisocial behavior typically starts at a relatively young age with 
multiple escalating contacts with law enforcement.252 Summarily, the 
“hard” cases in this context involve older yet mentally immature 
teenagers charged with criminal acts. Developing perfect policy solutions 
proves difficult because maturity fluctuates from one adolescent to the 
next, and maturity even varies from one trait to another for any given 
individual. 
Youth carted into the adult criminal justice system lose access to many 
beneficial features unique to juvenile jurisdiction: most importantly, the 
priorities of individualization and rehabilitation. States have expanded 
transfer through legislation to exclude offenses from juvenile jurisdiction, 
delegate transfer discretion to prosecutors, and permit blended 
sentencing, all of which have encroached upon the historical role of 
judges in making transfer decisions.253 Statutory exclusion continuously 
 
248. See generally Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting juveniles from being sentenced to prison 
for life without parole for non-homicide offenses); Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (prohibiting juveniles from 
receiving mandatory life sentences without possibility of parole for homicides). 
249. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (explaining various transfer mechanisms).  
250. See supra notes 188–192 and accompanying text. 
251. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOC. 
RESEARCH, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, 1945–1963 
(1999), available at www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/studies/7729. 
252. COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE & BOARD ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 
JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE 66 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001), available at 
https://www.nap.edu/read/9747/chapter/5 (“It has long been known that most adult criminals were 
involved in delinquent behavior as children and adolescents; most delinquent children and 
adolescents, however, do not grow up to be adult criminals.”). 
253. Dawson, supra note 111, at 45. 
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envelops larger portions of youth offenders as states lower their 
jurisdictional age, add more crimes to the automatic transfer list, and 
supplant age-offense criteria for “once an adult, always an adult” 
jurisdictional rules.254 
The transfer population represents a small percentage of youth in the 
justice system.255 Beginning in 1994, cases transferred by judicial 
discretion greatly decreased, in part because juvenile violent crime 
declined and in part because prosecutorial discretion and automatic 
waiver statutes replaced the former heavy reliance on judicial waiver.256 
Although few states fully track transfer numbers, of those that do, those 
states “that have only judicial waiver laws . . . [see] average transfer rates 
[that] are generally lower than those in the remaining seven states, which 
have statutory exclusion laws, prosecutorial discretion laws, or both.”257 
Judicial waiver numbers give insight into this demographic. Just over 
600,000 juveniles confront a formal waiver petition in the juvenile courts 
annually.258 Of the cases that apply discretional judicial waiver, 
approximately one percent of those who were sixteen years old and older 
were transferred, while only 0.1% of juveniles who were age fifteen and 
below were transferred from juvenile court.259 Black males over age 
sixteen are removed from juvenile jurisdiction at a higher percentage than 
their white peers.260 Violent offenses against a person result in transfer 
 
254. Lydia E. Frost Clausel & Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, in THE CHANGING 
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra 
note 4, at 181, 187 (“Under recent reforms of the transfer process, many states have enlarged the 
category of cases for which criminal court jurisdiction is exclusive—by lowering the jurisdictional 
age, expanding the category of serious charges triggering criminal court jurisdiction, or 
supplementing age-offense criteria with criteria relating to the juvenile’s prior offense history.”). 
See e.g. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(5) (2018). 
255. “Less than a quarter of the cases reached criminal court via judicial waiver. More common 
were exclusion cases (42%) and prosecutorial direct files (35%).” See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 
16, at 12. 
256. Id. at 10. 
257. Id. at 17–18. 
258. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 2011 at 1 (2014), available at 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248410.pdf (“In 2011, U.S. Courts with juvenile jurisdiction handled 
more than 1.2 million delinquency cases. More than half (54%) of these cases were handled 
formally (i.e., a petition was filed requesting an adjudication or waiver hearing).”). 
259. See SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2016 40 (2016) (“Cases involving juveniles age 16 or older 
were much more likely to be judicially waived to criminal court than those involving younger 
juveniles”). 
260. Id.  
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more often than property offenses.261 The judicial transfer numbers 
greatly decreased after the mid-nineties, falling to around 5,400 in 
2011.262 Experts attribute this trend in part due to the expansion of non-
judicial transfer statutes.263 
A statutory transfer process begins the absolute deprivation for some 
of their liberty interest. Under some circumstances, the defendant 
receives an individualized assessment—but not always. After removal 
from juvenile jurisdiction, trial courts need to focus on how youthfulness 
affects fundamental fairness at other critical stages. 
B.  The Individualized process of Discretionary Judicial Waiver 
Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, juvenile court judges in most 
states held the exclusive authority to make the transfer determinations for 
youth defendants.264 Judicial waiver, unlike statutory exclusion and 
prosecutorial direct file, requires a resource investment, both human 
capital and financial. This burden emanates from the efforts needed to 
prepare individualized files for the judge’s consideration. It entails a 
collection of professionals investigating the offense, putting together a 
report profiling the alleged offender, indulging a hearing, and fulfilling 
proof requirements.265 
Mandatory and presumptive judicial waiver laws chip away at judges’ 
ability to exercise discretion over transfer after conducting an 
individualized assessment.266 Presumptive waiver places the burden on 
defendants to persuade courts against transfer.267 Mandatory waiver 
removes any subjective considerations, because the juvenile judge plays 
only a ministerial role limited to deciding (1) whether the case comports 
with statutory requirements, and (2) whether the state presents probable 
cause for its charges.268 Prosecutorial direct file, another limit on judicial 
waiver, occurs before an accused youth even steps foot in the 
courtroom.269 On this front, the Kent Court provided a road map for lower 
 
261. Id. at 39. 
262. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 258, at 1 (stating that delinquency cases 
peaked at 13,600 case in 1994 and decreased by 61 percent to 4,500 cases in 2011). 
263. Id. at 1–2. 
264. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 8. 
265. Dawson, supra note 111, at 54–56. 
266. Id. at 46. 
267. Id. at 57. 
268. Id. at 58, 65. 
269. Id. at 53. 
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courts in this effort.270 
In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed the procedural 
requirements for discretionary judicial waiver.271 The relevant transfer 
statute required a “full investigation” of the circumstances for 
transferring jurisdiction but set no standards for the court’s decision as to 
waiver.272 The defense attorney had filed two motions: a motion for a 
hearing on the waiver issue and petitioner’s psychiatric condition; and a 
motion for access to the social services file developed during the 
petitioner’s probation period.273 The juvenile court summarily 
transferred the case to criminal jurisdiction without addressing the 
motions, conferring with the petitioner’s attorney or parents, or recording 
its factual findings or reasoning.274 The court considered three pieces of 
information: staff recommendations, the social services file, and the 
probation office’s report.275 The petitioner’s attorney did not gain access 
to these documents.276 Kent eventually stood trial in the criminal system, 
where the jury convicted him on all charges.277 
On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted a single issue: “the infirmity 
of the proceedings by which the Juvenile Court waived its otherwise 
exclusive jurisdiction . . . .”278 The petitioner argued that there were 
apparent process deficiencies—no hearing, no written reasons for 
transfer, and no access to pertinent documents.279 The Supreme Court 
expressed no concern with the juvenile court’s wide latitude to wield its 
discretion in making the transfer decision, but it did take issue with the 
court’s “arbitrary procedure.”280 The Court’s analysis centered on 
procedural due process and fairness principles.281 The following excerpt 
summarizes the Court’s thoughts on how procedural due process and 
fundamental fairness apply when transferring someone from juvenile to 
criminal jurisdiction: 
 
270. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966). 
271. Id. at 544. 
272. Id. at 547. 
273. Id. at 545–46. 
274. Id. at 546. 
275. Id. at 547. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 550. 
278. Id. at 552. 
279. Id. 
280. “The statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial degree of discretion as to the factual 
considerations to be evaluated, the weight to be given them and the conclusion to be reached. It 
does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure.” Id. at 553. 
281. Id.  
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[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such 
tremendous consequences without ceremony—without hearing, 
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. 
It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with 
respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It would be 
extraordinary if society’s special concern for children . . . permitted this 
procedure. We hold that it does not.282 
Following its procedural cautions, the Court moved on to set forth 
reasons for its ruling, grounded in the original intentions behind creating 
a juvenile system separate from criminal courts.283 It explicitly 
acknowledged that the juvenile justice system works on a different plane 
from ordinary criminal law.284 As it did again in In re Gault, one year 
later, the Court in Kent recognized that juvenile jurisdiction provided 
specific protections that were not available once a juvenile was 
transferred to criminal court.285 The Court considered these civil rights 
on the same level as risking comparatively harsher punishments that may 
be imposed once transferred to criminal court.286 
In the end, the Court concluded that the juvenile judge should have 
held a hearing, provided relevant documents to the petitioner’s attorney, 
and developed a written record explaining its reasons to transfer 
jurisdiction.287 The Court reasoned that this result was dictated not only 
by the statute but also by “the context of constitutional principles relating 
to due process and the assistance of counsel.”288 Despite Kent’s heinous 
charges, including burglary and rape, the Court still held steadfast to the 
thought that transfer to “adult criminal treatment” should be the 
exception, not the rule, for those initially falling within juvenile 
 
282. Id. at 554. 
283. See id. at 554–56 (discussing the original theory and policy behind the jurisdiction’s 
Juvenile Court Act). 
284. “The theory of the District’s Juvenile Court Act, like that of other jurisdictions, is rooted 
in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris.” Id. at 554. 
285. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (“[J]uveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures 
applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal 
due process”). For example, juvenile offenders enjoy limited anonymity, detention among other 
youth as opposed to adult inmates, efforts at community reintegration, and, importantly, the ability 
to retain certain civil rights such as voting and eligibility for public employment. Kent, 383 U.S. at 
556–57.  
286. “In these circumstances, . . . decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the matter 
to the District Court was potentially as important to petitioner as the difference between five years’ 
confinement and a death sentence.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 557. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
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jurisdiction.289 
The Court suggested that individualized considerations overlap those 
that bear on individualized sentencing determinations. The Kent 
Appendix lists eight factors:  
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether 
the protection of the community requires waiver.  
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner. 
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, 
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if 
personal injury resulted. 
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint . . . . 
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one 
court when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are 
adults . . . . 
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude 
and pattern of living. 
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile . . . . 
8. The prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood 
of reasonable rehabilitation . . . by the use of procedures, services and 
facilities currently available . . . .290 
Noticeably, the Kent factors reflect the themes expressed as policy 
through the Miller holding developed five decades later.291 The 
delineation between juvenile and criminal court systems rests in their 
objectives: juvenile courts are to “provide measures of guidance and 
rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal 
responsibility, guilt and punishment. The state is parens patriae rather 
than the prosecuting attorney and judge.”292 The Supreme Court affirmed 
the appellate court’s priority that youth offenders should be tried in 
juvenile courts as the rule and adult criminal courts as the exception, and 
then only after an individualized assessment.293 Most states adopted the 
Kent factors and its requirement of a hearing and written findings as the 
constitutional guide for judges when exercising their discretion to transfer 
 
289. “[I]t is implicit in [the Juvenile Court] scheme that non-criminal treatment is to be the 
rule—and the adult criminal treatment, the exception which must be governed by the particular 
factors of individual cases.” Id. at 560–61 (alteration in original) (quoting Harling v. United States, 
295 F.2d 161, 164–65 (D.C. Cir. 1961)). 
290. Id. at 566–67. 
291. Compare id.; with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012). 
292. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554–55. 
293. Id. at 560–61. 
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juveniles, grant a motion for reverse transfer, impose an adult sentence 
when a juvenile sentencing option exists by law, or impose blended 
sentences.294 
Years before Roper v. Simmons, Lydia E. Frost Clausel and Richard I. 
Bonnie argued that statutory exclusion combined with an individualized 
assessment in criminal court may alleviate constitutional fundamental 
fairness concerns.295 They pointed to a trend in appellate court opinions 
expressing reservations about automatic transfer laws when there was no 
standing without any reverse waiver provision in place.296 Criminal court 
judges in jurisdictions with a reverse waiver provision hold a second 
chance card: reverse judicial waiver permits transfer back from criminal 
to juvenile jurisdiction for cases placed on the criminal docket through 
direct file or statutory exclusion.297 Most states employ the Kent factors 
as a guide for judges presented with these reverse waiver and blended 
sentencing options.298 Yet reverse waiver statutes are an insufficient 
countermeasure to the problems apparent with statutory exclusion and 
prosecutorial discretion laws, though, because criminal court staff are ill-
sourced to adequately investigate reverse waiver or juvenile sentencing 
factors.299 
Hughes v. Delaware illustrated the due process problem that transfer 
statutes pose. In Hughes, the issue was whether a statute requiring that all 
children charged with a felony to be automatically transferred from 
family court to superior court without judicial investigation was 
unconstitutional.300 The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the statute 
 
294. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1128 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding district 
court’s discretion to impose an increased adult sentence on juvenile without submitting penalty to 
a jury); Flakes v. People, 153 P.3d 427, 430 (Colo. 2007) (holding that district court has discretion 
on whether to impose blended sentence after direct file transfer to criminal court and remanded for 
resentencing); Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 51–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding case-specific 
findings of fact, including seriousness of offense, must be sufficient to support waiving juvenile 
court jurisdiction); State v. Dixon, 967 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Vt. 2008) (remanding trial court’s denial 
of motion for reverse transfer to juvenile jurisdiction as an abuse of discretion). 
295. Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 190. 
296. Id. 
297. Dawson, supra note 111, at 50; Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from 
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 83, 100. 
298. Feld, supra note 297, at 120. 
299. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 
227, 242–43. 
300. The amendment provided that “if a child reaches his eighteenth birthday prior to an 
adjudication on a charge of delinquency arising from acts which would constitute a felony,” the 
Family court must automatically transfer the matter to Superior Court. 69 Del. Laws 205 (1994).  
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violated the constitutional guarantees of both due process and equal 
protection under the law.301 First, the statute violated the constitutional 
due process guarantees because it eliminated judicial review to assess the 
basis, if any, for prosecuting a child as an adult.302 Second, the statute 
violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law because 
children unfairly charged with committing a felony, but ultimately 
convicted of a misdemeanor, were accorded disparate treatment from 
those children initially charged only with a misdemeanor.303 The Court 
noted that the statute would be constitutional if it included a reverse 
waiver provision.304 
In In re Boot, the statute under consideration conferred exclusive 
original jurisdiction over certain youthful offenders on the adult criminal 
court without the benefit of a reverse transfer hearing.305 The defendants 
argued that the statute was unconstitutional on due process, equal 
protection, and Eighth Amendment grounds.306 The Supreme Court of 
Washington upheld the constitutionality of the statute.307 However, in a 
concurring opinion, a justice of the court questioned whether the lack of 
judicial authority to transfer the case back to juvenile court rendered this 
statute unconstitutional as applied.308 In conclusion, frontline scholars 
were correct when they cautiously surmised that “[t]hough the law is only 
beginning to develop in this area, it appears that an opportunity for 
individualization through a reverse waiver hearing may be a 
constitutionally required safety valve in some situations.”309 
 
The statute also alters the existing scheme by preventing the defendant from obtaining 
judicial review of an important aspect of the amenability process. First, by mandating 
that those offenders falling under its purview be automatically transferred to Superior 
Court . . . . Moreover, the provision explicitly eliminates the reverse amenability process 
in the Superior Court under section 1011 for those children transferred to that court for 
trial as adults. 
Hughes v. State of Delaware, 653 A.2d 241, 247 (Del. 1994).  
301. Hughes, 653 A.2d at 252. 
302. “Independent judicial review to assess the basis for prosecuting a child as an adult is a 
‘prerequisite for sustaining the constitutionality of the Delaware statutory framework.’” Id. at 250 
(quoting Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Del. 1993)). 
303. Id. at 252. 
304. Id.  
305. In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 969 (Wash. 1996). 
306. Id. at 966, 972. 
307. Id. at 966–67. 
308. Id. at 977 (Alexander, J., concurring) (citing Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241 (Del. 1994)) 
(“[W]hile in the abstract such restraints exist, there is no provision in this statute for a judicial 
proceeding where the prosecutor's discretion is tested. Although I will presume good faith on the 
part of the charging authority, that is not sufficient to protect a child’s constitutional rights.”). 
309. Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 192. 
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C.  Tough on Crime: Transfer Without Individualized Assessment 
Transfer to criminal court precedes harsh punishments and, for 
juveniles, deprivation of rights in the justice process.310 When 
questioning whether juveniles have a right to avoid that transfer, we must 
note that juvenile courts draw their authority solely from legislative 
grants of jurisdiction. This may empower the legislature to define 
jurisdictional boundaries, removing the argument that youth have a right 
to be tried in the juvenile courts. But this fact does not usurp the right for 
an individualized assessment at critical points within the justice process. 
Statutory exclusion and prosecutorial direct file forgo altogether or 
shroud in opacity any individual assessment of a youth’s character, 
background, and the circumstances surrounding the offense. Statutory 
exclusion policies displace juveniles to the criminal courts based on their 
offense category, chronological age, and, at times, their criminal 
history.311 Those policies also allow prosecutors to manipulate the 
charged offense, permitting them limited discretion under this pathway 
to transferring youth.312 Some prosecutors share concurrent jurisdiction 
between the juvenile and criminal courts and may direct file in either 
jurisdiction.313 Prosecutors may or may not consider juveniles’ 
individualized traits, but if they do, this consideration is devoid of 
transparency or accountability.314 
Transfer laws come in three varieties. Twenty-nine states use statutory 
exclusion laws and automatic transfer statutes to initiate a case against a 
juvenile in criminal court or to immediately transfer a case from juvenile 
to criminal court based on the defendant’s age, the crime committed, and 
sometimes the juvenile’s previous record.315 Forty-five states and the 
District of Columbia allow juvenile judges to transfer a case to the 
criminal court in response to the prosecution’s motion.316 Finally, 
fourteen states and the District of Columbia permit prosecutors to direct 
file charges against a juvenile in criminal court.317 Every state employs 
 
310. Feld, supra note 297, at 83. 
311. See Dawson, supra note 111, at 66 (adding that these categories reflect legislative judgment 
that these are the only criteria which are suitable to make the sorting decision and providing 
statutory examples of each). 
312. Feld, supra note 297, at 98.  
313. Id. 
314. See Dawson, supra note 111, at 53 (stating that prosecutorial selection for judicial waiver 
decisions lack “prior or concurrent procedures” and that “[n]egative decisions are not subject to 
review”). 
315. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 6. 
316. Id. at 2. 
317. Id. at 3. 
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at least one of these three transfer laws.318 In addition, twenty-five states 
permit reverse waiver, wherein a criminal court judge can return a 
defendant to juvenile court or apply juvenile sentencing principles.319 
Other states also implement statutes mandating that after a juvenile has 
been transferred from juvenile jurisdiction to criminal court, all 
subsequent charges must be tried in criminal court.320 Additionally, 
blended sentencing provisions play into the sentencing options for 
juveniles that commit more serious crimes. 
Of all the transfer mechanisms, prosecutorial discretion presents the 
greatest concern. Summarily, “[d]iscretionary prosecutorial waiver 
supplants the juvenile court system processes that were historically 
designed to treat each child individually like a child.”321 In some states, 
prosecutors can transfer any case to criminal court based solely on a 
juvenile’s age.322 Other states limit prosecutorial transfer to certain 
serious crimes, but even then, prosecutors need not provide an 
explanation for their decisions.323 Statutory exclusion statutes are by no 
means a suitable alternative, but at least they remove the perception of 
bias and inappropriate exercises of authority. Notably, prosecutors 
employ both mechanisms sans a judicial hearing or producing a formal 
record. Both prosecutorial discretion and statutory exclusion transfer 
mechanisms prohibit participation from judges, defendants, and their 
legal representatives. 
Again, the argument runs that youth offenders do not hold an inherent 
right to remain within the juvenile court jurisdiction because state 
legislatures created these courts.324 Accordingly, state legislatures may 
constitutionally define access to juvenile jurisdiction as they see fit so 
 
318. Id. at 2. 
319. RICHARD E. REDDING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN 
EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 2 (2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
ojjdp/220595.pdf. 
320. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 2. 
321. Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests 
Violation Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles’ Due Process Rights, 110 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 233, 280 (2005). 
322. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-276(1), 29-1816(1)(a)(ii)–(iii) (2018) (requiring 
consideration of circumstances in exercising prosecutorial discretion while limiting prosecutorial 
discretion to juveniles over fourteen years old accused of a felony or traffic violation); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-6-203(f) (2018) (mandating certain factors that the prosecutor must consider while 
limiting prosecutorial discretion for felony cases to those over the age of seventeen and violent 
felony cases to where the minor is over fourteen years old). 
323. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 20.  
324. See generally Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bland, 
472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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long as their transfer rules are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory 
classifications.325 The following excerpt from Colorado’s Supreme Court 
represents this justification: 
It is clear that the General Assembly intended to exclude certain 
offenders from the juvenile court system by defining certain serious 
offenses as per se criminal and properly within the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the district court even if committed by a juvenile over the 
age of 14. This is not unreasonable in light of the apparent legislative 
decision that certain repeat offenders, or those who have committed 
serious offenses, should be separated from those juveniles who 
perpetrate relatively less serious or less violent crimes and who, in the 
view of the legislature, are more likely candidates for rehabilitation.326 
Statutory exclusion does a haphazard job of combining age and 
charged offense to render transfer determinations.327 These laws cast a 
monolithic net intended to gather “irredeemable” youth based on offense 
severity and chronological age. These populations show great diversity 
in terms of maturity, sophistication, and amenability to rehabilitation—
leading to overbreadth of transfers to criminal court and misalignment 
with the legislative and institutional goals that are appropriate for this age 
group.328 
State supreme courts overwhelmingly characterize jurisdictional 
waiver as a purely procedural matter working independently of equal 
protection and Eighth Amendment concerns, both because (1) again, 
juvenile courts are a state legislative creation and (2) attendant 
constitutional rights are present whether a youth is tried in a juvenile or 
criminal court. The due process argument concludes that “the character 
of the proceeding,” not its “consequences to the accused,” is 
determinative when reviewing the level of procedural protections that are 
owed to alleged offenders.329 These courts characterize the limited reach 
of Kent as not speaking to transfer mechanisms in toto, but only to 
discretionary judicial waiver.330 Moreover, Kent does little to describe 
 
325. Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that there is no 
inherent right to be treated as a juvenile and thus state legislatures may restrict when accuseds are 
treated as juveniles); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. 1982) (affirming prosecutorial 
discretion without mandatory judicial hearing in the absence of suspect factors); State v. Berard, 
401 A.2d 448, 453 (R.I. 1979) (holding that statutory exclusion is a “reasonable and rational 
classification and that it violates neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
326. Thorpe, 641 P.2d at 940. 
327. See, e.g., State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661–62 (Conn. 1998). 
328. Feld, supra note 297, at 118; Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 188. 
329. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973). 
330. Clausel and Bonnie write that “[i]t must be emphasized, however, that Kent is better seen 
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the evidence needed to cross over a youth into criminal jurisdiction. In 
summation, under current systems, no one stands accountable or draws 
scrutiny for transfer decisions, not even judges in most states.331 
The separation of powers doctrine shelters prosecutorial discretion, an 
executive branch function, from court oversight, excepting arbitrary 
classifications based on race and religion; though age and offense would 
not qualify.332 In United States v. Bland, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia offered an influential opinion on the 
constitutionality of that prosecutorial discretion.333 The federal statute at 
issue excluded from juvenile jurisdiction “those 16 and older charged by 
the United States attorney with murder, forcible rape, robbery while 
armed, burglary in the first degree, or assault with intent to commit one 
of these offenses, or any such offense and a properly joinable offense.”334 
The defendant argued that the provision violated his right to due 
process.335 According to the court, prosecutorial discretion only requires 
review under allegations that disparate treatment between charging 
decisions was based on “race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification[s].”336 
Judge Skelly Wright penned a dissent that focused on the 
indistinguishable consequences flowing from the waiver decision 
regardless of the transfer mechanism. He noted that the procedural 
protections due to the defendant remain the same, regardless of whether 
a judge waived the defendant into criminal court or a prosecutor brought 
the defendant there initially.337 He defined the issue as “not whether the 
prosecutor should be permitted to make waiver decisions, but rather how 
he should go about making those decisions.”338 The prosecutor’s 
 
as a procedural due-process decision because the Supreme Court said nothing to question the 
fundamentally discretionary character of the decision and did not prescribe any substantive 
criteria.” Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 184. 
331. Thus, the overall picture is that transfer is outside the reach of the rule of law. The decision 
whether a youth should be treated as a juvenile or an adult lies within the virtually 
unreviewable discretion of legislators (who draw unreviewable classifications based on age, 
offense, and perhaps offense history), prosecutors (who need give no reasons at all), or 
judges (who must give a reason compatible with whatever the legislature has prescribed in 
the statute).  
Id. at 198. 
332. Id. at 192–97. 
333. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  
334. Id. at 1333 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1303, at 226 (1970)). 
335. Id. at 1331. 
336. Id. at 1336 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962)).  
337. Id. at 1342–50 (Wright, J., dissenting).  
338. Id. at 1342.  
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partisanship earned him an additional layer of skepticism addressed by 
the Kent hearing requirements.339 And Judge Wright’s dissenting opinion 
lends no analytical value to the “dubious vestiture-divestiture distinction” 
used by the majority opinion; instead, the dispositive facts rest in the 
different treatment given children in juvenile courts as compared to 
criminal courts.340 And so, because “the consequences to the child are 
precisely the same[,] . . . the procedural protections should be 
identical.”341 Due process inheres to the individual, yet the prescription 
varies based on the offender’s age, notwithstanding the accessibility of 
juvenile jurisdiction for minors.342 
One dramatic point that Judge Wright dealt with was that the 
prosecutor’s waiver decision removes the consideration of the offender’s 
juvenile status from the equation after removal to criminal court and that 
this decision is “largely unreviewable.”343 For this reason, “it is 
especially vital that the procedures be fair at the one point in the criminal 
process where these matters are considered.”344 Judge Wright 
characterized the juvenile judicial system as “another system of justice 
with different procedures, a different penalty structure, and a different 
philosophy of rehabilitation.”345 Although given limited legal import, 
Judge Wright addressed the dilemma that despite the inability to predict 
an offender’s rehabilitative potential, stowing juveniles away in adult 
facilities almost guarantees their unwanted exposure to harmful 
conditions and influences.346 
Juvenile defendants argue against prosecutorial discretion on the 
grounds that it occurs without a hearing and that it encroaches upon the 
judiciary’s authority to sentence convicted defendants. This power to levy 
charges falls within the traditional functions of the executive branch 
 
339. Id. at 1343–44 (referencing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)).  
340. Id. at 1343.  
341. Thus the United States Attorney’s charge acts to divest the Juvenile Court of its pre-
existing exclusive jurisdiction in precisely the same manner as does the juvenile judge’s 
waiver decision. Since the divestiture is the same, the procedural rights accompanying it 
should be the same, and we need look no farther than Kent to determine what those rights 
are. 
Id. at 1343, 1344. 
342. “It should be clear, then, that the test for when the Constitution demands a hearing depends 
not on which government official makes the decision, but rather on the importance of that decision 
to the individual affected.” Id. at 1345. 
343. Id. at 1348.  
344. Id. 
345. Id. (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1971); Kent v. United States, 
383 U.S. 541, 557 (1968)). 
346. Id. at 1349–50.  
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through prosecutorial discretion.347 In Cox v. United States, the Fourth 
Circuit observed that while the consequences of judicial and prosecutorial 
waiver may be identical from a defendant’s perspective, the constitutional 
analysis depends on the decision maker.348 As far as constitutional due 
process protections, the hearing requirement applies only to judicial and 
quasi-judicial proceedings, not prosecutorial decisions.349 Many states 
followed the Cox approach to uphold the constitutionality of their state 
legislatures’ delegation of authority over the transfer decision from 
juvenile to adult court to prosecutors. Notably, in these analyses, the court 
focuses on “the character of the proceeding, rather than its consequences 
to the accused, [as] largely determinative of his rights.”350 The 
prosecutor’s discretion also falls under the umbrella of executive power 
and thus sits apart from judicial requirements without a legislative 
grant.351 
The Court’s opinion in Roper v. Simmons reinvigorated the state’s role 
in protecting children beyond juvenile jurisdiction and into the criminal 
court context.352 The three common transfer mechanisms all have unique 
challenges directly related to whether each weighs in earnest a juvenile 
offender’s youthful traits. For example, prosecutorial direct file takes 
place in a cloaked space with no accountability from an adversarial 
hearing or judicial review. New Jersey enacted a law to address this 
problem by requiring that prosecutors provide written reasons for seeking 
transfer to criminal court and receive judicial approval for that request.353 
Another criticism targets discretionary judicial review. Specifically, the 
trial court’s transfer decision receives a perfunctory review, if at all, only 
after the defendant’s conviction and sentencing. Texas remains one of a 
few states that allows transfer solely through discretionary judicial 
waiver.354 The Texas legislature passed a law granting transferred youth 
the right to appeal a transfer decision before their final judgment and 
 
347. Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1216–17 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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350. Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 658, 661 (Miss. 1975). 
351. Russell, 543 F.2d at 1216–17. 
352. [N]otwithstanding the societal response, the historical goals upon which the juvenile 
court system was established must still function today in concert with the doctrine of parens 
patriae. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper “awakens” the sleeping doctrine of parens 
patriae by reiterating some of the very same observations regarding differences between 
adults and youth that originally motivated the establishment of the juvenile court system. 
Green, supra note 321, at 265. 
353. In re V.A., 50 A.3d 610, 616 (N.J. 2012). 
354. See State-by-State Summary of Transfer Laws, supra note 190. 
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tasking the state supreme court to implement procedures for an expedited 
decision on those appeals.355  
As reviewed in detail above, the Kent factors ask judges to review three 
categories of evidence: the offense, the defendant, and institutional 
concerns.356 The Kent factors also arise in the criminal context for reverse 
waiver, blended sentencing, and youthful offender sentencing 
determinations. Statutory exclusion and prosecutorial direct file seem to 
be the only fateful determinations in this process that escape any 
requirement for individualized assessment requirements. 
Collectively, pursuant to Kent and the juvenile sentencing trilogy, the 
Supreme Court has cultivated an unenumerated constitutional right that 
is available to juvenile offenders independent of attendant procedures.357 
The line between procedural and substantive rights appears blurred under 
due process holdings. State supreme court cases analyzing statutory 
exclusion and prosecutorial discretion determine that a juvenile’s 
procedural rights are preserved because juvenile courts exercise 
jurisdiction only to the extent granted under state legislative authority, 
such that transfer to criminal court does not deprive the juvenile 
defendant of any constitutional criminal procedure rights. This analysis 
wholly overlooks the thrust behind the argument that “children are 
different” and the philosophical and expert justifications underpinning 
juvenile courts and the more recent sentencing opinions. 
Roper, Graham, and Miller, along with the subsequent case of 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, which made Miller applicable, prompted the 
resentencing of juveniles then serving sentences of life without parole.358 
The strength of the movement ignited as a result of these doctrinal shifts 
cannot be understated. Most germane to this Article, the juvenile 
sentencing trilogy forced courts and legislatures to view juvenile 
behavior through the redemptive lens of expert researcher. The courts 
must balance an individual’s background against the severity of his crime 
when imposing sentences. The Supreme Court’s mandates continue to 
reinvigorate, strengthen, and define the penological goal of juvenile 
rehabilitation though state-level decision makers register this pursuit to 
varying degrees. Additionally, in some states, these cases provided 
persuasive legal footing to argue for raising the minimum criminal court 
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jurisdictional age.359 
The Supreme Court’s constitutional reforms were met with mixed 
reactions from state courts, legislatures, and executive branches. For 
example, some state courts embraced the chance to resentence juveniles 
serving life-without-parole sentences.360 They provided a meaningful 
opportunity for release into the community. Other state courts and 
executive branches, pursuant to Montgomery, ensured that these juveniles 
would receive mandated rehearings but used them to impose even 
lengthier sentences with parole.361 These defendants will receive nothing 
less than their original life-without-parole sentence. Yes, advocates 
enjoyed some success in changing maximum jurisdictional age 
statutes.362 But juvenile transfer laws, the most common gateway to 
lengthy sentences, remain widely unyielding to litigation and unnoticed 
through the political process. 
Eighth Amendment and due process arguments do not fully resolve the 
more nuanced issues associated with juvenile offenders transferred to 
criminal courts. Some scholars argue that Graham created a right to 
rehabilitation via its holding that juveniles committing a non-homicide 
offense should be given a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”363 But there does not 
seem to be much detail about achieving rehabilitation for this 
population.364 The Eighth Amendment argument runs into the doctrinal 
hurdle of characterizing transfer as punishment.365 We know there are 
many adverse consequences absent from juvenile courts that threaten 
youth who are transferred to criminal jurisdiction. All roads, however, 
lead to the conclusion that juveniles are constitutionally different from 
adults; and even the transfer and sentencing stages incompletely identify 
the need to compensate for youthfulness traits throughout the entire 
justice process. A permeating substantive due process right based on age 
status and its attendant disadvantages in achieving fundamental fairness 
 
359. See supra text accompanying notes 166–167 (explaining the successes of raise-the-age 
campaigns). 
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361. Id.  
362. See supra notes 166–167. 
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REV. 99, 100, 124 (2010) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). 
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Graham, 560 U.S. at 73–74). 
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at certain stages of the justice process seems aligned with fully 
interpreting the juvenile sentencing cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory web spun by the states leaves a constitutionally 
vulnerable hatch wherein youth can matriculate through the justice 
process without receiving an individualized assessment at any stage. 
Even though jurisdictions retain every right to weigh these youthfulness 
traits to varying degrees, more than a dozen states give no credence to 
constitutional distinctions between juveniles and their adult counterparts 
once those juveniles are brought into the criminal justice process.366 
Beginning in the eighties, state policymakers spasmodically built 
elaborate legislative schemes to account for juvenile offenders. States 
employ three common mechanisms to transfer juveniles to criminal court 
without an individualized assessment: mandatory juvenile transfer, 
statutory exclusion, and prosecutorial direct file.367 Once in criminal 
court, even fewer states present the opportunity for a juvenile to backtrack 
via reverse waiver or criminal blended sentencing.368 Finally, many states 
automatically bring any subsequent charges in criminal court pursuant to 
“once an adult, always an adult” policies.369 Whether knowingly or 
unwittingly, these statutory pathways intersect in a manner at odds with 
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that children are, indeed, different 
from adults.370 
Juvenile jurisdiction imbues an acceptance of children being different, 
yet policymakers driven by social influence equivocate on executing and 
prioritizing retribution against rehabilitative goals.371 Juvenile courts are 
moored to constitutional principles through the fundamental fairness 
guaranteed by due process. Before the sea change initiated by the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper v. Simmons, state supreme courts 
were beginning to question the constitutionality of dropping juveniles 
into the criminal system without contemplating their age at any point in 
the justice process.372 Now, social science, developmental psychology, 
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and neuroscience all demonstrate that youth are immature, susceptible to 
external stressors, and transitory.373 These traits, especially in 
combination, have led the Supreme Court to conclude that children 
possess a diminished culpability and can experience rehabilitation. 
The Supreme Court has sought to protect juveniles in the criminal 
context through categorical bans and the procedural requirement of 
individualized assessment.374 But these restrictions apply only to the 
harshest penalties: death and life without parole.375 The Court’s analyses 
of these penalties discount the retributive goal, emphasize rehabilitation, 
dismiss incapacitation, and express skepticism toward their deterrent 
value. Currently, we see state supreme courts deliberating in earnest how 
to reconcile mandatory minimum sentences with the Court’s more recent 
pronouncements. Myriad state legislative responses to the Miller and 
Montgomery resentencing project also serve as a litmus test of both 
resistant and changing attitudes toward juvenile sentencing. 
At this point, children possess a permeating right in the form of 
individualized assessment, a right that places affirmative duties on state 
actors. The norm that “children are constitutionally different from adults” 
stands as a transferable observation that manifests to meet fundamental 
fairness goals.376 Similar to the Sixth Amendment’s “critical stages” in 
the justice process, the ever-growing knowledge of youthfulness makes 
it incumbent on the criminal justice system to identify when children are 
susceptible to their inherent deficiencies.377 Thus far, the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged these traits when applying the Fourth and Eighth 
Amendments. This must somehow translate further into the law. 
Alternate approaches have arisen to cure this problem. For example, 
every arrested youth should enter the justice process through the juvenile 
courts with a presumption against transfer to criminal court. If transferred 
to criminal court, an individualized assessment must be the procedural 
hurdle to transfer, whether initiated by the court or via a transparent 
prosecutorial motion for jurisdictional change. States could eliminate 
mandatory sentencing and require trial courts to conduct an 
individualized assessment before sentencing juvenile offenders. A more 
fulsome option would be to identify critical stages throughout the justice 
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process, those that require explicit consideration of how youthfulness 
traits affect courts’ treatment of juveniles being tried in adult courts. 
Legal commentators present cogent arguments supporting rehabilitation 
as a requisite component to incarcerating juveniles. On the other hand, in 
some states, individualism for sentences less than life without parole 
proves nonexistent. Jurisdictions operating a justice process with the 
constitutionally vulnerable space described above sentence juveniles “in 
the same manner as adults.” This practice conflicts with the now-
universal norm: children are different. 
